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Abstract
In response to user demands for mobile data security and maximum ease of use, ﬁngerpr-
int-secured mobile storage devices have been increasingly available for purchase. A ﬁngerpr-
int-secured Universal Serial Bus (USB) drive looks like a regular USB drive, except that it
has an integrated optical scanner. When a ﬁngerprint-secured USB drive is plugged into
a computer running Windows, a program on this drive will run automatically to ask for
ﬁngerprint authentication. (When the program runs the very ﬁrst time, it will ask for
ﬁngerprint enrollment). After a successful ﬁngerprint authentication, a new private drive
(for example, drive G:) will appear and data stored on the private drive can be accessed.
This private drive will not appear if the ﬁngerprint authentication fails.
This thesis studies the security of a representative ﬁngerprint-secured USB drive referred
to by the pseudonym AliceDrive. Our results are two fold. First, through black-box reverse
engineering and manipulation of binary code in a DLL, we bypassed AliceDrive’s ﬁngerprint
authentication and accessed the private drive without actually presenting a valid ﬁngerprint.
Our attack is a class attack in that the modiﬁed DLL can be distributed to any naive user
to bypass AliceDevice’s ﬁngerprint authentication.
Second, in our security analysis of AliceDrive, we recovered ﬁngerprint reference tem-
plates from memory, which may make AliceDrive worse than a regular USB drive: when
Alice loses her ﬁngerprint-secured USB drive, she does not only lose her data, she also loses
her ﬁngerprints, which are diﬃcult to recover as Alice’s ﬁngerprints do not change much
over a long period of time.
In this thesis, we also explore details in integrating fuzzy vault schemes to enhance the
security of AliceDrive.
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Overview
There have been several high-proﬁle security breaches of data on mobile storage devices,
including the theft of an external hard drive owned by an US Department of Veterans Aﬀairs
employee, which had personal data of about 26.5 millions of people [8]. Mobile storage
devices, such as a portable hard drive and a Universal Serial Bus (USB) drive, support data
mobility and thus provide much ﬂexibility. On the other hand, mobile storage devices also
pose serious security challenges.
Data stored on a non-portable device can be protected by a surrounding operating
system through access control mechanisms. Any access to such non-portable data requires
entity authentication ﬁrst and data access can be made ﬁne-grained through access control.
In contrast, data stored on mobile storage devices have no such protective mechanisms to
depend on: once stolen, a mobile storage device is exposed without any obstruction to the
adversary. Thus, for data on mobile storage devices, some alternative security mechanisms
are needed.
In recent years, ﬁngerprint-secured USB drives have appeared more and more frequently
on the commercial market. A ﬁngerprint-secured USB drive looks like a regular USB drive,
except it has an integrated optical scanner. When a ﬁngerprint-secured USB drive is plugged
into a computer running Windows, a program on this drive will run automatically to ask
for ﬁngerprint authentication. (When the program runs the very ﬁrst time, it will ask for
ﬁngerprint enrollment). After a successful ﬁngerprint authentication, a new private drive
(for example, drive G:) will appear and data stored on the private drive can be accessed.
This private drive will not appear if the ﬁngerprint authentication fails.
Historically, biometric authentications such as ﬁngerprint authentication are used by
highly secure systems, such as military information systems and nuclear plants. They tend
to give us a perception of high-level security.
2Problem Statement
In this thesis, we try to answer the following questions: Does a ﬁngerprint-secured USB
drive really provide high security? How hard is it to break the security of a ﬁngerprint-
secured USB drive? If it is insecure, how to enhance its security?
To answer these questions, we study the security of a representative ﬁngerprint-secured
USB drive, called AliceDrive, which is chosen randomly from the commercial market.
Contributions
In this thesis, we demonstrate that AliceDrive is highly insecure. Contrary to our
initial thought, it is pretty straightforward to bypass AliceDrive’s ﬁngerprint authentication
through binary code manipulation. This authentication bypass is a class attack, as our
modiﬁed DLL can be downloaded and used by any naive AliceDrive users.
An even more serious vulnerability is that in our study, we can retrieve AliceDrive’s
ﬁngerprint templates from memory. A human being’s ﬁngerprints are relatively stable and
remain unchanged for a long period of time, making ﬁngerprint revocation very hard. As
a result, losing ﬁngerprint templates stored on AliceDrive has serious consequence in both
security and privacy. In other words, our study shows that in some sense, a ﬁngerprint-
secured USB is worse than a regular USB drive: if stolen, the owner does not only lose his
or her data, but also their ﬁngerprints.
This thesis also studies the details of how to integrate fuzzy extractor schemes, speciﬁ-
cally fuzzy vault, to improve the security (the conﬁdentiality of both the private data and
the ﬁngerprint templates) of AliceDrive.
Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we give background
information and related work. In Chapter 3, a chosen commercial representative ﬁngerprint-
secured USB drive is analyzed, and vulnerabilities are found and exploited. Chapter 4
provides an academic and unimplemented security improvement for the device. Finally,
concluding remarks are given in Chapter 5.
Chapter 2
Background Information and Related Work
This chapter provides background information into the ﬁelds of research required for
this thesis as well as related works. Background information consists of topics necessary
for understanding the remainder of this thesis, while related works are the basis for our
contributions.
Background Information
Because some research into software reverse engineering tools and techniques was re-
quired for the analysis of our ﬁngerprint-secured USB drive, it is worth starting with a brief
discussion of this subject before describing in more detail ﬁngerprint biometrics, ﬁngerprint
matching, ﬁngerprint authentication security, and ﬁnally fuzzy extractors.
Software Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering is practically identical to the natural sciences, e.g., biology, chem-
istry, physics, etc. Both reverse engineering and these sciences are concerned with deriving
information based on the evidence acquired through observation and testing. The distinc-
tion between the two is reverse engineering is the process of extracting information or design
from anything man-made, while the sciences extract information or design from anything
natural [7]. Reverse engineering is often used as a last resort when information is, for what-
ever reason, unavailable. In many situations, the desired information may be unattainable
because the original information has been lost, or the owner of the information is unknown.
If the information is valuable, the owner may be unwilling to release the information as it
may encourage competition or conceal a company secret.
In terms of software, reverse engineering is the process of trying to understand the
structure and functionality of a program or its components which usually means trying to
recover the original source code from a program binary. In most situations original source
code recovery is an overly ambitious endeavor as it is usually impossible. This is because
there are many ways to write a program that result in similar machine code and many high-
4level programming language elements are often omitted during compilation [7]. In some
situations it is possible to completely recover source code as languages that compile to an
intermediate language, such as Java and any of Microsoft’s .NET languages, can be easily
reverse engineered into the original source code, if not something very similar. Intermediate
languages provide much more information about the original code than machine language
binaries, and therefore allow for near perfect re-creation of the original code. Because of
this, designers that use these languages sometimes use obfuscation techniques to greatly
obscure the code in such a way that any code acquired during reverse engineering is very
diﬃcult to interpret let alone reconstruct into its original form. Because of the diﬃculty,
and more often impossible nature in recovering the original source code, reverse engineering
usually requires detective like problem solving skills to infer what a program does and how
it works based on clues.
To recover any information from a binary ﬁle requires reverse engineering tools. The
basic categories of reverse engineering tools are:
• System monitoring tools: these tools leverage the fact that programs must communi-
cate with other ﬁles, programs, and devices, and this communication can be observed.
This information is helpful in determining a program’s structure and can give clues
as to the eﬀect of a program by disclosing what system calls are made, and what ﬁles
and devices are accessed.
• Disassemblers: these tools take program binary ﬁles and convert them to assembly
language. Any operation performed by the CPU can be translated into assembly
rather easily as there are far fewer interpretations of CPU instructions to assembly
code than CPU instructions to higher-level languages. Because of how easy it is to
reverse engineer program binaries into assembly code, disassemblers are a primary
tool for software reverse engineering, despite the fact assembly is harder to read and
understand as compared with high-level languages.
• Debuggers: a debugger provides a dynamic view of the code by allowing one to observe
the program as it is running which is often preferable to static code analysis. Other
than providing ease in code traceability, dynamic analysis can reveal information that
can not be determined from mere static analysis, such as stack and register values.
• Decompilers: these tools translate a binary program ﬁle into a high-level programming
5language, which does not necessarily have to be the original language the program
was written in. Often the code produced from a decompiler is more readable than
assembly language produced by a disassembler, and therefore may be preferable in
some situations.
The motivation to reverse engineer software is really no diﬀerent from any reverse en-
gineering endeavor, such as reverse engineering in an attempt to create similar or better
products, or malicious motivations as with attackers trying to discover weaknesses. Some-
times reverse engineering is required to understand or ﬁx legacy systems that are no longer
supported or well known. Speciﬁcally for software, reverse engineering can also be used
to analyze malicious software to determine its aﬀects on a system and to derive a defense
against it. For the purposes of this thesis, reverse engineering was used to determine system
weaknesses for academic purposes and to propose possible solutions to these weaknesses.
Fingerprint Biometrics
Biometric recognition, also called biometrics, is the automatic recognition of individuals
based on their physical and sometimes behavioral characteristics [1], which can be used for
authentication, identiﬁcation or data retrieval. Typically, authentication is used as a mecha-
nism to enforce access control. Once a user is authenticated (i.e., their identity is veriﬁed as
being from the list of valid users) the individual is granted access to something. What they
are granted access to could be anything, such as a building, room, bank account, computer,
hard drive, or an individual electronic document. Traditional authentication techniques
use “something you know”, such as passwords and pin numbers, or “something you have”
such as a key card, to verify a person’s identity, but biometric-based authentication uses
“something you are”, which provides a degree of extra diﬃculty for an imposter to forge
[10].
Naturally, not all physical or behavioral characteristics are well suited for biometrics.
A biometric should adhere to certain characteristics for adequate biometric recognition as
follows [1]:
• Universality: every person (or the vast majority of people) should have this charac-
teristic.
• Distinctiveness: any two individuals should be distinguishable based oﬀ the charac-
6teristic.
• Permanence: the characteristic should not change, or should change very little over
time.
• Collectability: the characteristic should be measurable.
Along with these requirements, it is often important in practice for a biometric charac-
teristic to take into account the following issues:
• Performance: the speed, accuracy, throughput and any resource or environmental
factors which aﬀect speed, accuracy and throughput of biometric recognition.
• Acceptability: the extent to which people are willing to use a biometric identiﬁer or
have a device scan this biometric identiﬁer in every day life.
• Circumvention: how easily it would be to forge the biometric characteristic of another
person.
Fingerprints are an ideal biometric as they are well balanced among these properties
[14, 15] and ﬁngerprint scanners are relatively cheap, making them even more ideal for
commercial biometric systems.
A ﬁngerprint is composed of ridges and valleys. Most often ridges are indicated by black
lines and valleys by white space in between the ridges (see Figure 2.1). The patterns and
characteristics formed by ridges and valleys can be classiﬁed into three levels of abstraction
[14, 15].
• Level 1: the ﬁrst and highest level of abstraction, called the global level, is concerned
with regions of a ﬁngerprint where the ridges and valleys form distinctive shapes, as
determined by high curvature, frequent ridge terminations, etc. These regions are
called singularities (depicted in Figure 2.2) are subcategorized as loops, deltas, and
whorls. These features can be useful in orienting prints for comparison, and also for
general categorization to simplify search and retrieval, but do not provide enough
distinctiveness for print matching.
• Level 2: called the local level, is concerned with more distinctive ﬁngerprint charac-
teristics called minutiae (meaning small details). With respect to ﬁngerprints, this
refers to how a ridge line may terminate (ridge ending) or divide (bifurcation).
7• Level 3: the ﬁnal and most detail-oriented level, called the very-ﬁne level, is concerned
with intra-ridge details including sweat pores, skin creases, ridge width and shape, and
incipient ridges. This level provides the most distinctive ﬁngerprint information, how-
ever requires high quality ﬁngerprint images and therefore high resolution ﬁngerprint
scanners (1000 dpi or higher) to capture these features.
Figure 2.1: Fingerprint Ridges and Valleys
Figure 2.2: Fingerprint Singularities
Fingerprint Matching
Fingerprint authentication is traditionally achieved through ﬁngerprint matching. An
automatic ﬁngerprint matching system has four main design components [10]:
• Acquisition: the process of converting the original ﬁngerprint into a digital image.
• Representation: it is not often the case that ﬁngerprint images are stored, as they vary
8so much from scan to scan. Instead, more invariant representations of key features of
the print are stored, which are called reference templates or simply templates.
• Feature Extraction: this is the process of extracting distinctive features from a bio-
metric for comparison against a reference template or for enrollment of a template.
• Matching: this is the process of taking an input ﬁngerprint and comparing it against
a stored reference template.
Authentication of a ﬁngerprint is an imperfect procedure, so when prints are compared,
variability of ﬁngerprint scans must be taken into account. This means during matching, two
ﬁngerprint reference templates are compared and a similarity score is returned representing
the likelihood the two prints are from the same ﬁnger. Two ﬁngerprints are considered
matched if the similarity score is above some threshold.
The imperfect and diﬃcult nature of ﬁngerprint matching stems from the fact that
features at each of the three levels of ﬁngerprint characteristic abstractions, more so at the
local and very-ﬁne level, can vary substantially from scan to scan due to high variability
called intra-class variation. The diﬀerent classiﬁcations of these are described as follows
[14, 15, 1]:
• Displacement: a ﬁnger may be placed at diﬀerent locations on a sensor on diﬀerent
scan attempts.
• Rotation: a ﬁnger may be positioned at diﬀerent angles with respect to the sensor
surface each time a ﬁngerprint is scanned.
• Partial overlap: displacement and rotation often cause part of the ﬁngerprint area to
fall outside the sensor’s scanning range.
• Non-linear distortion: the compression and stretching of a ﬁngerprint due to the plas-
ticity of skin. Capturing a ﬁngerprint is the process of transferring a three dimensional
physical ﬁngerprint into a two dimensional image representation. Because skin is ﬂex-
ible, the force applied to the ﬁnger on the scanning device and/or friction with the
ﬁnger and the scanning surface can distort the physical ﬁngerprint which is captured
as a non-linear distortion on a two dimensional image.
9• Pressure and skin condition: ﬁnger pressure, skin conditions such as dryness, disease,
sweat, grease, dirt, etc, as well as environmental factors such moisture in the air can
result in nonuniform contact with the scanner surface. Nonuniform contact can lead
to missing portions of a print or poor image quality regions.
• Noise: introduced by the scanning system, such as dirt or grease on the scanning
surface.
• Feature extraction errors: these errors occur as a result of the imperfect nature of
feature extraction algorithms. For example, a low-quality ﬁngerprint image may result
in the extraction of features that are not actually present in the ﬁngerprint.
Of these classiﬁcations of intra-class variation, displacement and rotation are most cor-
rectable by software. Correcting displacement and rotation to match the reference template
is called alignment, and is a crucial and necessary step for ﬁngerprint matching. The method
for aligning ﬁngerprints varies depending on the method of ﬁngerprint matching. There are
three basic methodologies for ﬁngerprint matching:
• Correlation-based matching: two ﬁngerprint images, the reference image and an input
image, are superimposed to ﬁnd the alignment with the maximum correlation between
pixels.
• Minutiae-based matching: minutiae points from two images (the reference image, and
an input ﬁngerprint) are compared to ﬁnd the alignment with the maximum number
of minutiae pairings between the two ﬁngerprints.
• Non-minutiae feature-based matching: uses any other non-minutiae feature of a print
for matching, including global and local texture information, level 3 features, shape
and size of the ﬁnger, etc. This method is a catch all category used to classify any
matching algorithm that does not implement the above two schemes. This method can
be used for low quality ﬁngerprint matching, as minutiae can be very diﬃcult to ex-
tract from a poor quality image. Non-minutiae-based schemes can also be used in con-
junction with minutiae-based matching to provide higher accuracy in print matching.
Non-minutiae-based matching is also useful when the area of a print to be matched
is so small that it only contains a few minutiae. Because this method of matching
10
can be used in numerous ways with any number of non-minutiae characteristics, the
technique for matching and alignment is not standard.
Matching based on local-level ﬁngerprint characteristics, minutiae, is the most popular
method of ﬁngerprint matching as well as the most analogous to how prints are matched
by experts manually [14, 15]. Minutiae-based matching is ideal for many reasons. Minutiae
provide ample distinctiveness, more so than level 1 (global) characteristics, and yet do not
require the high quality print samples, as is the case with level 3 (very-ﬁne) characteristics.
Also, extracting minutiae from a ﬁngerprint is fairly simple for medium to high quality
ﬁngerprints. A full ﬁngerprint can have over 100 minutiae, yet only 12-15 minutiae are
required for a high conﬁdence matching [14, 15]. This means only relatively few high quality
minutiae (as compared with how many are available on a ﬁngerprint) are required for high
conﬁdence matching, further reinforcing the use of minutiae-based matching schemes.
Minutiae-based schemes extract minutiae points from a reference ﬁngerprint image us-
ing some metric and store them in a reference template. During matching, minutiae are
extracted from another ﬁngerprint and compared against the reference template. An align-
ment is found that maximizes matches between the reference template and the minutiae
extracted from the new ﬁngerprint. Usually a similarity score is returned indicating how
much the reference template and the input ﬁngerprint match. If the similarity is above a
predeﬁned threshold, the validation attempt is successful.
The most common metric used for minutiae representation uses minutiae type, location,
and orientation [17, 18, 3] or a subset of these, which are described below.
• Type: minutiae can be classiﬁed into numerous types, such as spurs, islands, points,
lakes, crossovers, etc., as well as simple ridge endings and bifurcations (refer to Figure
2.3). Automatic minutiae extraction usually uses a more basic classiﬁcation scheme
consisting of bifurcations and ridge endings and sometimes a third category for unusual
points of interest. For example, the American National Standards Institute standard
ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007 [17] considers only four broad types of minutiae: bifurca-
tions, ridge endings, compound minutiae (such as trifurcations and crossovers), and
type undetermined. Similarly, CDEFFS (2008) [18] and M1/02-0142 [3] deﬁne three
minutiae types: ridge endings, ridge bifurcation and another or unknown type for
those minutiae which cannot be deﬁned.
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• Location: usually represented as a Cartesian coordinate pair, (x, y). The problem
with location of minutiae is the positioning of the origin of the Cartesian plane. The
origin could be placed anywhere, and is dependent on the standard used.
• Orientation: speciﬁes an angle, [0-360), of a minutia. The basis from which the angle
is derived is dependent on the standard. ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007 [17] deﬁnes the angle
as being between the horizontal axis of the coordinate system and the direction that
a ridge ending (or valley ending, for a bifurcation) points.
Figure 2.3: Minutiae Classiﬁcations
While type, location, and orientation are the most common metrics used to store minu-
tiae, there is no uniform standard, and any number and combination of minutiae character-
istics, including location, type, orientation (angle), and quality could be used. The metric
choice is proprietary and as such, the algorithms used to extract and align minutiae are also
proprietary.
Fingerprint Authentication Security
Security with respect to ﬁngerprint based authentication, as previously mentioned, usu-
ally implies access control. Fingerprint-based access control systems are meant to provide
high usability as no password must be memorized, nor a token carried. Fingerprints are
innate, and the user only has to have the ability to press their ﬁnger to the sensor to authen-
ticate. As great as ﬁngerprint-based access control sounds, ﬁngerprint matching techniques
can have serious negative security implications depending on the nature of the system being
secured.
If the system is meant to restrict access to a physical location, such as a building,
room, amusement park, testing facility, etc., the security of the reference template is the
only concern. The communication between the ﬁngerprint scanner and the machine which
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performs the print matching is also a concern but this issue is outside the scope of the
security provided by ﬁngerprint authentication.
To explain why the security of the reference template is important, consider the anal-
ogy of password authentication systems. In these systems the user claims an identity and
provides a password as proof of this identity which is compared against a stored password.
It is rarely the case, if ever, that the passwords to compare against are stored in clear text,
because if the ﬁle which stores the passwords is compromised by an intruder or misbehav-
ing system administrator, all the accounts of those whose passwords are listed will also be
compromised. Instead, a cryptographic hash of the password is stored, called password ver-
iﬁcation data or PVD. During validation the attempted password is hashed and compared
against the stored PVD. A cryptographic hash is considered a one-way function which is
characterized by the ability to calculate a password hash easily; however it is diﬃcult to
recover from the hash the original password [22]. An attacker could still mount a dictio-
nary attack on any compromised PVDs, however this attack is against the strength of the
password and not the cryptographic hash.
For biometric based authentication systems this approach cannot be taken due to high
variability from scan to scan (i.e., intra-class variation). For a cryptographic hash function
h and two close ﬁngerprint minutiae samples taken from the same ﬁnger, A and B, h(A)
and h(B) will be unpredictably diﬀerent. For this reason, a ﬁngerprint reference template
cannot be hashed and must be stored in a clear text format, which carries with it the same
security issues as storing passwords in clear text. The primary diﬀerence is, unlike with a
password which can vary from one account to another and over time for the same person, a
ﬁngerprint does not and cannot be changed in response to an attack, making it very diﬃcult
to recover from such a compromise.
Exposure of the reference templates is a concern among all ﬁngerprint-based authenti-
cation systems, but for systems that secure data using ﬁngerprints, exposure of any private
information is also a concern. If an attacker can gain physical access to the data store of
the protected data, it may be possible to bypass ﬁngerprint validation altogether, either
programmatically or analyzing the physical device, and look directly at the raw bytes in
storage, essentially giving complete access to all supposedly protected data as well as any
stored reference templates.
With any system such as this, an attacker could always delete, modify, or physically
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destroy the stored data, so security (access control) with respect to these systems refers
speciﬁcally to conﬁdentiality, as it is the only security characteristic which can actually be
protected. Fingerprint matching alone only provides authentication, not conﬁdentiality. In
many situations, this is an acceptable risk as it is considered too diﬃcult or too conspicuous
for an attacker to access the physical data storage device. For example, most operating
systems rely on this principle for user accounts. Removing the hard drive and analyzing the
ﬁle allocation table could allow an attacker to read all stored data, and no authentication of
any kind is necessary. While most of us accept the assumption this is unlikely for systems
located in physically secure locations, we are less likely to accept it for portable data storage.
Smaller data storage devices, such as laptops, external hard drives, USB drives, etc. are
frequently taken outside protected locations, and because of their sizes they are less likely
to be noticed missing, and are prone to theft and loss. If an attacker intercepts such a
device, they can privately perform whatever procedures are necessary to compromise the
data on the drive for as long as it takes. Therefore, it is no longer an acceptable risk to
leave data unprotected in clear text.
To truly protect the security (conﬁdentiality) of these systems, encryption must be used
on all sensitive data. The question naturally arises, how does one create a cryptographic
key from a ﬁngerprint? Fingerprints vary substantially from scan to scan due to intra-class
variation, so direct mapping to a cryptographic key from a ﬁngerprint is not possible. To
correct for intra-class variation, storage of some sort of reference data is mandatory but
clear text storage of reference data may compromise the ﬁngerprints the data represents.
The issues of reference template and data security can both be solved using a cryptographic
mechanism called fuzzy extractors.
Fuzzy Extractors
The concept of a fuzzy extractor was ﬁrst introduced in [4] and is based oﬀ the fuzzy
commitment scheme introduced in [13]. A fuzzy extractor reliably extracts a uniformly
random secret (or nearly uniformly random secret), S, in an error tolerant way from noisy
input (noisy referring to input that may have erroneous data intermingled with valid data).
With respect to biometric data, a fuzzy extractor works by taking a biometric reference
template, T, and computing the value P (a reference value used for error correction) and a
secret S. P reveals little information about T or S hence it can be made public [22]. During
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authentication, a fresh biometric with a reference template T ′ is used with P to recover
S′. If T ′ is suﬃciently close to T, then S′ should be the same as S. In order to validate a
successful authentication, S′ must be compared with S. To do this, a cryptographic hash
of S must be stored, and the hash of S′ is compared against the hash of S. Thus for some
cryptographic hash function h, the set of required information for authentication using a
fuzzy extractor is {h(S), P}. Once authenticated, a user can simply be granted access to
the object or location in question or, with the case of information access control, S can then
used as a cryptographic key.
A system using a fuzzy extractor for cryptographic key generation and recovery may
forgo the explicit authentication step of comparing cryptographic hashes and validate im-
plicitly by attempting to decrypt data using S′. If the user can read the unencrypted data,
then it can be assumed they are a valid user. This is computationally wasteful if S′ is
invalid, especially if the data to decrypt is rather large; therefore, the matching algorithm
as described above should be used to ﬁrst determine if S′ is valid.
Since both elements of {h(S), P} reveal little about S or T, if the set is compromised by
an attacker, the original reference template and the secret (the cryptographic key) are still
secure, seemingly solving all the shortcomings of biometric authentication. The problem
is the fuzzy extractor concept is rather abstract and can be applied to any biometric,
that is, concrete implementations may deviate somewhat from the above description and
the details of concrete implementation are omitted here. An implementation of a fuzzy
extractor depends on characteristics of the biometric data. Since essentially fuzzy extractors
measure closeness of an original biometric input to a subsequent query biometric, speciﬁc
implementations diﬀer on the metric used for closeness. Popular proposed implementations
use such metrics as hamming distance, edit distance, set diﬀerence, and set intersection.
Hamming distance [9] implementations are better suited for biometric data that can
be easily represented as a string of bits. An implementation has been developed in [13].
Set diﬀerence and set intersection metrics work well with biometric data represented as a
set of elements. Implementations of set diﬀerence fuzzy extractors have been developed in
[4, 5, 11, 12], and a set intersection based fuzzy extractors have been developed in [20, 16].
A ﬁngerprint reference template is most easily thought of as a set of elements, where
each element contains information on a speciﬁc minutiae point (such as type, location,
orientation, quality, etc.). As such, closeness metrics that use sets are more practical for
15
ﬁngerprint biometric fuzzy extractors. Because of intra-class variation, the set of minutiae
captured from the reference image and the set of minutiae captured from a subsequent print
may be drastically diﬀerent, not only in the ordering and number of elements (minutiae)
captured, but also in the details of each element. Therefore, a set metric based fuzzy
extractor for ﬁngerprints must be error tolerant to handle these variations.
Related Work
In chapter 3 the security of a ﬁngerprint-secured USB drive is analyzed, which is pri-
marily accomplished by reverse engineering. Despite there being many manuals, books, and
tutorials on the general concept of reverse engineering, there is no known related reverse
engineering work for our speciﬁc analysis for this thesis. In chapter 4, we provide a hypo-
thetical security improvement for the device, which involves fuzzy extractor mechanisms,
speciﬁcally fuzzy vault. As such, the only real related work for this thesis involves the
concept of fuzzy vault and ﬁngerprint speciﬁc implementations.
Fuzzy Vault
The fuzzy vault scheme proposed in [11, 12] is a more speciﬁc implementation of a
fuzzy extractor for set data. While somewhat more speciﬁc than the concept of a fuzzy
extractor, fuzzy vault is still rather abstract, however it shows potential for implementation
for ﬁngerprint-based biometrics.
A fuzzy vault is a cryptographic construction where a user can lock a secret in a fuzzy
vault using a set of data (the locking set). Another user can unlock the secret from the
vault with a suﬃciently close set to the locking set, called the unlocking set. The vault
reveals little information about the secret or the locking set and therefore may be made
public. The secret secured by the vault must be numeric, speciﬁcally an integer, and the
size of the integer is limited, therefore the vault cannot secure complex data, however it
can be used to secure something like a phone number, social security number, numeric user
ID, or more importantly for our purposes, a cryptographic key, which can then be used to
secure more complex data.
The vault is essentially a set of Cartesian coordinates (x, y). Some of these points lie
on a polynomial P, while the vast majority of these points, called chaﬀ points, do not. The
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security of the vault is dependent on the number of chaﬀ points. The secret secured by the
vault is stored in one or more coeﬃcients of P. To unlock the secret, a user must be able to
select a set of non-chaﬀ points (genuine points) out of the vault greater than some threshold
value to form the unlocking set. The threshold is based on the degree of the polynomial, and
is always one more than the supposed degree of P. Any coeﬃcients not a part of the secret
are chosen randomly from the universe of possible values (thus the “supposed” polynomial
degree, as it is possible for the highest degree to have a coeﬃcient of 0, consequently dimin-
ishing the polynomial degree, however depending on the universe of possible of values, this
may be considered highly unlikely). Reconstruction of the original polynomial is achieved
through some set error correction code, either based on set diﬀerence or set intersection. No
matter what error correction scheme is used for any speciﬁc implementation, the underlying
principal that allows for the reconstruction of P is polynomial interpolation.
Fuzzy vault is meant to allow for some discrepancies in the unlocking set, meaning some
of the elements of the unlocking set may not lie on P; however, such an unlocking set may
still be able to reconstruct P. This is the reason for error correcting code of some sort.
The most obvious error correcting approach is to use a set intersection metric in which
every subset of T elements is taken in an attempt to derive the original polynomial using
Lagrange’s polynomial interpolation algorithm. For each attempt, the derived secret is
hashed and compared against a hash of the genuine secret. Set intersection in this manner
can become computationally infeasible with larger unlocking sets.
To simply things, [11, 12] choose a set diﬀerence error correction for their analysis,
speciﬁcally Reed-Solomon error correction code. The diﬀerence between set intersection
and set diﬀerence is that with set intersection the unlocking set can be of any size so long
as there are T genuine points in the set. With set diﬀerence, an unlocking set must have a
certain percentage of valid elements in order recover P. The exact number of required valid
elements for Reed-Solomon is (T+U)/2 where U is the number of elements in the unlocking
set.
The generalized fuzzy vault scheme described above, when applied to ﬁngerprints does
not account for inherent issues of ﬁngerprints. The primary issues involve encoding of ﬁn-
gerprint characteristics (speciﬁcally minutiae) into the vault during vault creation, aligning
ﬁngerprints due to intra-class variation prior to the unlocking set selection and the manner
in which the unlocking set is chosen. In [16], the authors attempt to resolve these missing
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details, and produce their own ﬁngerprint-based fuzzy vault implementation to secure a
cryptographic key. This implementation uses ﬁngerprint minutiae for vault encoding, using
minutiae location and orientation. These values are decomposed into binary representations
that are then concatenated to form vault x values to be plugged in to P to produce vault
y values (P(x)). Unlike the originally proposed fuzzy vault scheme, this scheme uses set
intersection to reconstruct P. In addition to storing the vault publicly, helper data used in
aligning ﬁngerprints is also stored. More speciﬁc details of this scheme will be discussed in
chapter 4.
Chapter 3
Security Analysis
In this chapter, we analyze the security of our commercial representative ﬁngerprint
secured USB drive. Our goal is to evaluate the security the device provides and identify any
vulnerabilities as a basis for security improvements. Security with respect to devices such as
these refers to the protection of not only the private data but also the ﬁngerprint reference
templates used for authentication. Determining if the secret data can be recovered alone,
while seemingly the most important goal in this analysis, is in many ways not as powerful as
recovering the reference templates and deciphering their format. Conceivably, if the format
could be deciphered and enough information is present, any recovered templates could be
used to produce an artiﬁcial ﬁngerprint (also known as a gummy ﬁngerprint) which could
then be used for any ﬁngerprint biometric system, past, present or possibly future, where
the recovered ﬁngerprint is enrolled, including simple identity veriﬁcation systems, physical
access control systems, or more pertinent for this research, data access control systems.
It is worth noting that it is neither our intention to discriminate against the company
that produces the USB device studied nor to discourage consumers from using this spe-
ciﬁc product. To avoid identifying and discrediting this ﬁngerprint-protected USB drive,
throughout this thesis the selected USB drive will be referred to by a pseudonym, AliceDrive.
This pseudonym will also be substituted in diagrams or code references that originally used
the actual device name. (Often, in cryptography literature secure communication is dis-
cussed in the setting of two users, Alice and Bob. For portable storage devices, such as the
one used in this analysis, the communication isn’t between two individuals, rather one user
wishes to store data securely for later use. Essentially, Alice is communicating with herself
in the future, thus the name AliceDrive.)
Our analysis is focused toward software and we consider the hardware a black box. Soft-
ware weaknesses with respect to security are more powerful as they do not require physically
breaking or opening the device, and consequently do not pose the risk of permanently dam-
aging and corrupting the hardware and any stored data. Also, once a software weakness
has been identiﬁed, a software exploit can be created and disseminated allowing anyone to
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compromise the security of the device with little to no skill.
The information known prior to analyzing the AliceDrive was purely from the user’s
manual accompanied with the AliceDrive when it was purchased. This manual explains,
from a user’s perspective, how the AliceDrive should be used, including how to con-
nect/disconnect the AliceDrive to a computer, enroll a ﬁngerprint, authenticate with a
ﬁngerprint, and back up user credentials. This user manual does not provide any insight to
the internal structure of the device or the type of security provided.
Although little was known prior to our analysis with respect to the AliceDrive security,
we did make some assumptions. First, we assumed the device was indeed ﬂawed, in that
it does not use any fuzzy extractor mechanisms to secure the data. This means that the
data is either stored in clear text, or is encrypted but with a key that is stored in clear
text somewhere on the device. Similarly, if no fuzzy extractor mechanisms are used, then
the reference templates are also stored in clear text (i.e., the reference templates map out
the location, orientation, and type of minutiae), however their speciﬁc format would still
have to be deciphered. Secondly, we assumed that the device did measure the ﬁngerprint
with respect to its minutiae. This is the most common ﬁngerprint biometric data used (see
chapter 2), and therefore we felt that the AliceDrive would likely not deviate from the norm.
These two assumptions were fundamental to our analysis in this chapter.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will ﬁrst describe the AliceDrive from a user’s per-
spective and provide an overview of important reverse engineering tools used in this study.
Following this, we provide our security analysis which consists of several steps, including
initial security tests, analysis of the software structure, and the analysis of the ﬁngerprint
veriﬁcation and enrollment processes. Our security analysis culminates at an authentication
bypass and obtaining a signiﬁcant portion of the AliceDrive ﬁngerprint reference template
format.
Device Description
The AliceDrive is an eight gigabyte ﬁngerprint-based USB storage drive designed specif-
ically for use with Windows operating systems (XP and newer). The device has three
partitions: public, private and public read-only. When the device is inserted into a USB
port, the public and public read-only partitions are mounted separately as two independent
drives (for example F: and G:). These drives are made available immediately once the de-
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vice is plugged in without authentication. Anyone may read from and write to the public
drive as with an ordinary USB drive. The public read-only drive contains user manuals in
many diﬀerent languages and an Autorun.exe. As the name suggests, creating new ﬁles or
modifying preexisting ﬁles on this drive is prohibited.
To access the private partition, ﬁngerprint-based authentication is required. On the
side of the device is a rectangular shaped ﬁngerprint scanner. Authentication software runs
automatically once the drive is inserted into a USB port. If for some reason it does not, the
Autorun.exe in the public read-only drive can be executed to bring up the authentication
interface. This interface asks the user to swipe his or her ﬁngerprint on the scanner to
access the private drive. At this time the user must swipe their ﬁngerprint from the base of
the ﬁngerprint to the tip of the ﬁnger over the scanner. Through testing it was determined
that the device is able to sense the direction the ﬁnger is swiped through the friction of the
ﬁnger against the sensor. This mechanism prevents the positioning of the scanner relative
to the ﬁngerprint from aﬀecting the ability of the device to interpret the ﬁngerprint as being
right side up so long as the ﬁnger is pulled across the scanner in the manner described.
The interface will continue to prompt for a valid ﬁngerprint until a scanned ﬁngerprint
is recognized (i.e., the scanned ﬁngerprint matches a previously enrolled ﬁngerprint). Once
authenticated, the public drive is unmounted and the private partition is mounted in its
place, eﬀectively replacing the public drive with the private drive, hence it is impossible to
access the public and private drive simultaneously. After the private drive has mounted,
the user can read and write to it as with any other mounted drive through the mechanisms
provided by the operating system. To unmount the drive the user must right click the
AliceDrive icon from the Windows system tray and select quit. This will cause the private
drive to be unmounted and the public drive to be mounted in its place.
Along with simple data storage, the AliceDrive allows users to save usernames and
passwords for website authentication and perform managerial tasks, such as backing up,
restoring, resetting, removing and adding user proﬁles. The device allows for the storage
of at most ten user proﬁles. Since each proﬁle is allowed to save one ﬁngerprint, the
device can only store ten ﬁngerprints. Through testing, it was determined that a previously
enrolled ﬁngerprint may not be enrolled twice, so the device may only store up to ten unique
ﬁngerprints.
The AliceDrive provides four authentication preferences: ﬁngerprint only, password only,
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or both. Any authentication involving passwords was ignored as the focus of this analysis
was strictly on ﬁngerprint-based authentication.
Reverse Engineering Tools
Reverse engineering tools were required for the security analysis of the AliceDrive. The
primary tool of choice was IDA Pro Advanced version 5.2.0. An unoﬃcial guide for IDA
Pro [6] was used as a reference. IDA Pro is an all encompassing reverse engineering tool,
and while it is very powerful, containing many capabilities, for our purposes it was only
used for its basic decompiler, disassembler, and debugger.
Version 5.2.0 does not have all the capabilities of newer versions. One capability desired
which was not available was the ability to alter a binary and save the changes back to
the ﬁle. To accomplish this, the tool OllyDbg version 1.10 was used. OllyDbg is a free
assembler-level debugger that allows a user to disassemble a binary, alter or add to the
assembly code, and commit the changes back to the ﬁle. This functionality is necessary for
manipulating any AliceDrive libraries to create an authentication bypass.
Initial Security Tests
Before attempting to reverse engineer the AliceDrive, some basic tests were performed to
validate that the device’s security was suﬃcient enough to require reverse engineering tools
and techniques, i.e., the security cannot be bypassed simply using the operating system or
using some automated tool.
The ﬁrst test was to determine if the addition of a ﬁle to the private drive had a
visible eﬀect on either of the two public drives. A document was added to the private
drive, and then the remaining available space of both the public and public read-only drives
were compared to their original sizes before the ﬁle was added. No changes were observed
indicating they indeed were separate drives.
The next test was to determine if the reference templates were stored hidden on one of
the three drives. To test this, a new ﬁngerprint was enrolled and the remaining available
space of each of the three drives was checked for diﬀerences. No changes were observed
indicating that there is another storage partition on the drive never made visible.
The device was also plugged into a Linux machine and the disk dump command (dd)
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was used. If the drive somehow does not protect against a disk dump, it is possible to
view the raw bytes of the entire drive and recover all information stored on the device,
including the private partition and the reference templates. Disk dump could only dump
ten megabytes of the drive’s eight gigabytes, and could not determine any viable partitions
on the drive. The ten megabytes dumped did not contain data on the private partition or
any user proﬁle information, such as user names or ﬁngerprint templates.
Not surprisingly these results indicated that the device’s security is not completely
transparent, and cannot be simply bypassed without reverse engineering. The next step
was to understand the device’s software (the software that executes when Autorun.exe is
called), which we will refer to as the AliceDrive controller. Since the controller manages,
among other things, authentication and making available the private drive, understanding
how it works and where key functionality is performed provides locations of high interest
for further detailed reverse engineering and analysis.
Software Structure Analysis
To begin analysis of the controller program, the executable was ﬁrst located; however
the controller was not explicitly installed nor were there any apparent directories containing
any AliceDrive executables or library ﬁles in the Windows programs directory.
To determine the location of the controller software, the authentication interface was
started and the Windows processor manager was opened. In the list of running processes was
a process called AliceDrive.exe. Searching the C drive for the executable name showed it was
located in the directory C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\AliceDrive
(this directory listing is for a Windows XP operating system and may diﬀer on later Win-
dows OS releases). The directory “Application Data” is a hidden directory apparently used
by many programs to discreetly store data and binaries.
In addition to AliceDrive.exe, the AliceDrive directory contains the following dynamic
link library (DLL) ﬁles:
• LTTS1NDUT176.dll
• LTTUSB.dll
• PasswordBank.dll
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• PTFVLib.dll
• PTSDK4 SS500A PTFV.dll
All ﬁles here, including AliceDrive.exe, are assumed parts, or modules that work to-
gether. Therefore, each ﬁle of the AliceDrive directory will be referred to as a module.
Since the controller software can run only onWindows operating systems, it was our hope
that each module was developed in a .NET language, which is compiled to an intermediate
language (Microsoft intermediate language). Many tools, including IDA Pro, can decompile
intermediate languages into a nearly perfect copy of the original source code. Unfortunately,
IDA Pro determined that all the AliceDrive modules were in machine code, therefore each
ﬁle was disassembled (converted to assembly language) as opposed to decompiled into a high
level language for initial analysis (decompilation is possible with machine code binaries, but
the resulting code is usually as complicated if not more so than the assembly alone).
Code obfuscation is a technique used when the source code is easily recoverable, such as if
the code is compiled to an intermediate language, or for security critical systems that depend
on the secrecy of their algorithms (security through obscurity). Our fear was that because
of the current state of secure biometrics, and their lack of commercial implementation, the
AliceDrive does not provide any real computational security, and will therefore rely on the
obscurity of its execution. If such obfuscation techniques were used with the AliceDrive, it
would make static analysis of the assembly very diﬃcult as any meaningful function names
would be replaced with nonsense. After disassembling each module, it was apparent no
obfuscation techniques were used as functions had descriptive names that clearly indicated
their functionality.
The modules of the AliceDrive are designed for Windows, and as such these ﬁles follow
the executable ﬁle format speciﬁc to Windows called the portable executable (PE) format.
One important characteristic of PE ﬁles useful for analyzing the structure and functionality
of modules are imports and exports. In each PE ﬁle there is a table of imported and
exported functions. An import table contains a list of functions used by the current module
but located in some other module. Each function in the import table is identiﬁed by its
function name and the module it is contained in. When a PE ﬁle is loaded for execution,
each function in the import table is found in the appropriate module’s export table. An
export table provides a list of public functions and an address for each function called a
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relative virtual address or RVA, used to determine the actual address of the function during
execution.
Import tables can reveal a lot about the relationships among modules, and export tables
reveal the provided functionality of each individual module (provided the names of the
functions are not obfuscated). Ideally an import table would be a complete list of all other
functions used by a module but this is not always the case. Linking DLL ﬁles can be done
in one of two ways, statically or at run time. If a DLL is linked statically, a reference to
any linked functions are listed in a PE ﬁle’s import table. If a DLL is linked at runtime,
the address of the required DLL function is acquired while the program is running. In
these situations an import table entry is not necessary since the function address is resolved
dynamically. This can make deciphering a program’s structure and relationships not as
transparent since the import tables cannot be trusted to contain all imported functions.
Instead of only checking the import table, locating all function calls to a Windows API
called GetProcAddress can be used. This function determines the address of a function
at runtime, eﬀectively performing runtime linking of a library. Using import tables and
a search for GetProcAddress revealed the AliceDrive software structure (as seen in Figure
3.1) and analysis of the function names present in each module’s export table in relation to
this structure hinted at their responsibilities.
AliceDrive.exe
PTSDK4_SS500A_PTFV.dllPasswordBank.dll
LTTS1NDU176.dll PTFVLib.dll
LTTUsb.dll
Figure 3.1: AliceDevice System Structure
Based on the observed AliceDrive structure, AliceDrive.exe communicates with only two
other modules, PasswordBank.dll and PTSDK4 SS500A PTFV.dll. It was apparent from
the export table that PasswordBank.dll exported functions related to web browsing, as seen
25
below:
• iAddLoginUrl
• iDeinitialIE
• iDelLoginUrl
• iGetOpenIE
• iGetPBLength
• iGetUrlTitle
• iInitial
• iInitialIE
• iOpenUrl2
• iOpenUrl
• iSaveFormData
Most functions either have “IE” (presumably Internet Explorer) or “Url” in the func-
tion name. As mentioned in the AliceDrive description, part of the device’s functionality
is to save usernames and passwords for website authentication so a module devoted to
this kind of functionality was expected. Since this module apparently is not involved in
veriﬁcation or any security related functionality (access to the private directory or the ref-
erence templates), then if its not provided by AliceDrive.exe it must be handled through
PTSDK4 SS500A PTFV.dll either directly or indirectly through the remaining three mod-
ules. In fact, it can be easily veriﬁed by viewing the export table PTSDK4 SS500A PTFV.-
dll (seen below) that this module is probably responsible for, among other things, mounting
the private drive as well as enrolling new ﬁngerprints.
• bAPI4 CdromOrFlash
• bAPI4 CheckSensorStatus
• bAPI4 CloseSensor
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• bAPI4 GetImage
• bAPI4 GetLogicalDrive
• bAPI4 HMFVCLoseLib
• bAPI4 HMFVEnroll
• bAPI4 HMFVGetParas
• bAPI4 HMFVOpenLib
• bAPI4 HMFVSetParas
• bAPI4 HMFVStartEnroll
• bAPI4 HMFVVerify
• bAPI4 Inquiry
• bAPI4 MediaChange2Cdrom
• bAPI4 OpenDevice
• bAPI4 OpenSensor
• bAPI4 ReadSecureArea
• bAPI4 StopImage
• bAPI4 WriteSecureArea
• bMediaChange2Flash
Several functions jump out as potential functions of interest, such as bAPI4 ReadSecu-
reArea, bAPI4 WriteSecureArea, bAPI4 HMFVVerify, and bAPI4 HMFVEnroll.
Many functions in PTFLib.dll, LTTS1NDU176.dll, and LTTUSB.dll have very similar
names to those in PTSDK4 SS500A PTFV.dll implying that PTSDK4 SS500A PTFV.dll
may serve as some kind of controller or application programming interface (API) for secu-
rity related functionality, providing a common interface but delegating most work to sub-
sidiary programs, as the structure in Figure 3.1 implies. Most of the functions contained
in PTSDK4 SS500A PTFV.dll begin with the preﬁx “bAPI4”, probably representing the
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type and version of whatever API the module provides. Even the name of the module
itself implies this since it contains “SDK” most likely standing for software development
kit. Often software development kits are simply APIs.
Since SDKs and APIs are usually standardized and widely used, our hope was docu-
mentation for PTSDK4 SS500A PTFV.dll would be publicly available online. A Google
search was used for “PTSDK4 SS500A PTFV.dll” to ﬁnd any documentation for this mod-
ule. This search yielded no results, so each module name of the AliceDrive system structure
was also searched in hopes of ﬁnding any related material whatsoever. The only module
that had any meaningful Google results was PTFVLib.dll. The result was a document “A
Programmer’s Guide for Fingerprint’s SDK” [23]. This document contains descriptions and
parameter lists for what the authors of this document call “SDK functions” as well as the
names of related ﬁngerprint SDK modules for their product. The document is rather vague
and does not give any indication as to what the described system or product actually is and
which one of the SDK modules mentioned actually contains the functions listed, however
reviewing the list of ﬁngerprint SDK modules reveals some information. The names and
descriptions of each SDK module are as follows:
• WISCMOS2.sys: a driver program.
• PTSDK4 WISCMOS2 PTFV.dll: a controller for ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation and a sensor.
• WisCMOS2.dll and DEC207.dll: controls the sensor and USB communication.
• PTFVLib.dll: a ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation kernel.
Apparently there is some sort of sensor and USB drive involved, which sounds very
similar to the AliceDrive. Comparing what can be observed with the AliceDrive with
each of these modules, it can be seen that whatever device this document was intended
for is similar, if not identical in system structure to the AliceDrive. WISCMOS2.sys
is described as a driver which is analogous to AliceDrive.exe which we previously de-
scribed as a controller providing all functionality of the device. The naming convention
for PTSDK4 WISCMOS2 PTFV.dll is very similar to PTSDK4 SS500A PTFV.dll, and its
description matches the assumption made before that it is probably a controller or API.
Looking at the export tables of both LTTUSB.dll and LTTS1NDU176.dll indicates these
functions have something to do with the sensor and USB communications, even the name
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LTTUSB.dll implies as such, which is consistent with the descriptions of WisCMOS2.dll
and DEC207.dll. Finally, PTFVLib.dll, which curiously is found both in this product and
the AliceDrive, is described as responsible for ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation. Observing the ex-
port tables of the AliceDrive PTFVLib.dll reveals function names containing “enroll” and
“verify”.
More evidence became apparent that this SDK document was indeed relevant to the
AliceDrive system when reviewing the functions it described. Seventeen functions are
described in this document, and of these eleven have identical names to those found in
PTSDK4 SS500A PTFV.dll. The function of the most interest for proving the validity of
this document was bAPI4 HMFVCLoseLib. Presumably this stands for close library. What
is interesting is the unusual spelling of close with a capital L. This could have been inten-
tional, that is the function does not actually stand for close library, however it seems like
a typographical error in the API. Since the same spelling is found in the AliceDrive SDK
module, this seemed to indicate that while not all of the functions in the AliceDrive SDK
module are represented in this document, perhaps both the AliceDrive and this product are
pooling from the same standard API source.
Finally, before more detailed analysis could be performed on the disassembled code,
it was important to determine the calling convention used by each AliceDrive module. A
calling convention deﬁnes how functions are called and returned in assembly language, i.e.,
how parameters are received by functions, the order of parameters, and where return values
are placed. IDA Pro was able to determine the calling convention used by each module is
cdecl. This is the standard C and C++ calling convention. In this convention parameters
are passed to a function using the stack. The parameters are pushed on the stack from right
to left, meaning the last parameter is pushed ﬁrst and the ﬁrst parameter is pushed last. It
is the responsibility of the caller to restore the stack pointer back to the original position
after the function returns. Since the stack grows from higher addresses to lower addresses,
the caller can reset the stack pointer by incrementing the stack pointer register, ESP, by
the number of bytes pushed as parameters. At the end of every cdecl function call there is
a RET command, which pops the instruction pointer pushed when the function was called.
Execution then resumes at this instruction pointer’s address. If a function returns a value,
it is stored in the EAX register sometime before the function returns.
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Fingerprint Veriﬁcation Analysis
Fingerprint veriﬁcation is a logical place to start detailed analysis since a veriﬁcation
function may be key to not only bypassing authentication (since after veriﬁcation the pri-
vate drive is mounted) but also identifying the location of the AliceDrive reference templates
(since they must be required for comparison to authenticate). According to the SDK doc-
ument the function responsible for ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation is bAPI4 HMFVVerify. This
function is one of the eleven also contained in the AliceDrive SDK module. The next step
was then to analyze this function both statically and dynamically to determine if this func-
tion is indeed responsible for ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation, and if the parameters and return value
of this function match those described in the SDK document.
The disassembly of bAPI4 HMFVVerify, as seen in Figure 3.2, appears to aﬃrm our prior
assumption of that the PTSDK4 SS500A PTFV.dll is a controller API since the assembly
code essentially does nothing more than pass its parameters on to the function referenced in
the DS register, apparently delegating responsibility to subsidiary modules. IDA Pro is able
to decipher the value in DS register as pointing to a function called bPTFVVerify which is
located in the PTFVLib.dll module. According to the SDK document bAPI4 HMFVVerify
returns 1 (true) if veriﬁcation is “OK”, and 0 (false) if veriﬁcation is “NG”, and takes the
following parameters in this order:
• int iResolution: the image resolution.
• int iWidth: the image width.
• int iHeight: the image height.
• BYTE *pFingerImage: pointer to an image buﬀer ready for veriﬁcation.
• BYTE **ppEnrolledFeatures: pointer to the enrolled features buﬀer addresses.
• int iEnrolledNum: the number of enrolled features.
• int *piMatchedID: returned pointer for the matched ID.
• int *piStatus: returned pointer for the veriﬁcation status.
Static analysis of the function did not show any discrepancies with the SDK document,
however, the values of these parameters and where exactly this function is called during
execution cannot be veriﬁed statically.
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Figure 3.2: IDA Pro Produced Assembly Code for bAPI4 HMFVVerify
IDA Pro provides debugging capability. A debugger allows the code to be analyzed while
it executes (dynamic analysis). Breakpoints can be set at any location in the assembly code
to pause execution and view the values of the stack and various registers and ﬂags. It is also
possible to step line by line through the assembly code to view the execution path taken.
Using IDA Pro’s debugger for dynamic analysis, it was determined that bAPI4 HMFVV-
erify was called every time a ﬁngerprint was scanned for authentication. Forgoing a detailed
analysis of each parameter passed to this function at this point, the assumption was made
that this function was correctly represented in the SDK document. Under this assumption,
the two values of interest are piStatus and the return value since these two are described
as indicating something about the veriﬁcation status.
Since bAPI4 HMFVVerify does nothing more than pass its parameters on to bPTFVVer-
ify, analysis of bAPI4 HMFVVerify is essentially an analysis of bPTFVVerify. As mentioned
before, the return value in the cdecl function calling convention is stored in the EAX regis-
ter. bAPI4 HMFVVerify does not store any value into this register after the function call
to bPTFVVerify, therefore if bPTFVVerify sets the EAX register, this value will be consid-
ered the return value. Indeed bPTFVVerify does set EAX before returning. Observing the
assembly statically revealed that only the values 0 and 1 are stored in this register before
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returning. During dynamic analysis, there was no situation discovered where the value 0
was assigned into the EAX register, no matter if veriﬁcation failed or was successful. Per-
haps if veriﬁcation is “OK” (a return value of 1), no erroneous situations occurred, not
necessarily that veriﬁcation passed, and if veriﬁcation is NG, veriﬁcation is not good, or
no go, because of some unexpected situation resulting in the inability of the algorithm to
continue its veriﬁcation attempt.
If the return value is used for what is essentially the algorithm status, then perhaps
piStatus is actually the result of the veriﬁcation attempt, i.e., veriﬁcation success or fail-
ure. Static analysis of bPTFVVerify showed that the hexadecimal values FFFFFFFF,
FFFFFFFE, 1 and 2 are stored in this variable (that is the pointer stored in this location
points to these values). It was expected that only 0 and 1 would be stored in this parameter,
indicating failure and success respectively, however observing a larger universe of values for
piStatus indicated veriﬁcation is not that simple. Reviewing the SDK document, there are
actually four possible predeﬁned values for piStatus:
• HMFV STS VF SUCCESS = 2
• HMFV STS VF FAIL = 1
• HMFV STS VF POORIMG = -1
• HMFV STS VF ERROR = -2
The IDA Pro debugger was used to verify that these values are stored in piStatus in the
appropriate situations. It was observed that upon successful veriﬁcation, the value 2 was
stored in piStatus, but if veriﬁcation failed, no value was set. When piStatus is originally
passed as a parameter, the value pointed to by piStatus was 4 and after invalid veriﬁcation,
piStatus still remained 4. If the image was poor, piStatus pointed to the value of FFFFFFFF
hex, which is two’s complement for -1. Much like for piStatus of 1, a situation where -2
(FFFFFFFE hex) is stored in piStatus was never observed however, static analysis does
verify that both 1 and -2 are possible values of piStatus. Knowing these values deﬁnitively
indicated we could conceivably bypass authentication (to be discussed in the section Break
#1).
Changing our focus from how veriﬁcation is achieved to the acquisition and deciphering
of reference templates, we continued to focus on bAPI4 HMFVVerify function. To verify
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a ﬁngerprint as is done in bAPI4 HMFVVerify, there has to be a comparison between
the stored reference templates and a ﬁngerprint query. The ﬁngerprint query may be in
the form of a data structure similar in content and structure to the reference template,
in which case preprocessing of the ﬁngerprint image is required, or the actual ﬁngerprint
image may be passed to this function, and processing of the ﬁngerprint image into a data
structure for comparison is performed within the veriﬁcation function. Either way, the
previously stored reference templates must be supplied for comparison. bAPI4 HMFVVerify
has a parameter ppEnrolledFeatures, which is a two dimensional array and according to the
SDK document, each array of ppEnrolledFeatures contains “enrolled features”. A reference
template essentially is a list of enrolled features, minutiae, so the assumption was that this
parameter contains the reference templates for every enrolled ﬁngerprint on the AliceDrive.
A total of ﬁve ﬁngerprints had been enrolled on the device at this point in analysis
(more than ﬁve had been enrolled prior to analysis, however these were deleted previously),
so ﬁve array addresses were expected after dereferencing the ppEnrolledFeatures pointer
address. The parameter iEnrolledNum of bAPI4 HMFVVerify which is described in the
SDK document as the number of enrolled features also contained the value ﬁve, further
validating that ppEnrolledFeatures contains the reference templates for the AliceDrive.
Extracting the addresses ppEnrolledFeatures points to yielded ﬁve evident addresses (as
seen Figure 3.3). Since the machine used for this analysis uses an Intel architecture, these
addresses are represented in little-endian notation. Converting them into a readable format
yielded the following hexadecimal addresses:
• 00483840
• 00483A34
• 00484010
• 00484204
• 004843F8
Having the starting location of each reference template does not reveal the size of each
template. Based on these array starting addresses, the possible sizes in bytes for each array,
except for the ﬁfth array, can be determined and are as follows (array one through four
respectively):
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Figure 3.3: Array Address of ppEnrolledFeatures
• 500
• 1500
• 500
• 500
According to the SDK document the maximum template size is 500 (presumably bytes),
which seemingly holds true for three arrays; however the second array starting at address
00483A34 is a maximum of 1500 bytes long. It was ﬁrst assumed that the arrays of a
two dimensional array are contiguous, but judging from these results it is either the case
that that the array sizes are variable beyond 500 bytes, or arrays do not have to be in
contiguous memory space. Since additional ﬁngerprints had been enrolled prior to analysis
but were deleted, it is possible that these reference templates are never physically deleted,
just not explicitly referenced (this was validated later after our security analysis). Since the
SDK document has held true for the AliceDrive SDK, the assumption was made that each
reference template does not exceed 500 bytes.
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Based oﬀ of this assumption, to determine the sizes of the AliceDrive reference templates,
another assumption was made that during a veriﬁcation attempt of an invalid ﬁngerprint,
every reference template must be compared against the invalid ﬁngerprint in its entirety.
Using a special debugger breakpoint called a hardware breakpoint enables the IDA Pro
debugger to pause execution if a speciﬁc memory address is read from or written to. During
veriﬁcation, it was assumed that the entire reference template structure of each reference
template stored must be read in for comparison purposes if a query ﬁngerprint is invalid (if
a print were valid, it would not necessarily the case that each reference template must be
compared). Based oﬀ our assumption of each reference template size and our observations of
the reference template addresses, hardware read/write breakpoints were set at the following
hexadecimal memory addresses:
• 00483840 (array 1 starting address)
• 00483A33 (array 1 ending address)
• 00483A34 (array 2 starting address)
• 00483C27 (assumed array 2 ending address)
• 00483C28 (assumed irrelevant address immediately after array 2)
• 0048400F (assumed irrelevant address immediately before array 3)
• 00484010 (array 3 starting address)
• 00484203 (array 3 ending address)
• 00484204 (array 4 starting address)
• 004843F7 (array 4 ending address)
• 004843F8 (array 5 starting address)
• 004845EB (array 5 ending address)
• 004845EC (assumed irrelevant address immediately after array 5)
If our assumption were true, then every breakpoint except for the breakpoints at 00483C-
28, 0048400F, and 004845EC should have been activated during an invalid ﬁngerprint ver-
iﬁcation attempt; however the assumption was not upheld by the results. The results
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were surprisingly inconsistent and not easily repeatable. For the ﬁrst attempt only two
breakpoints were activated during an invalid veriﬁcation attempt at location 00483840 and
00483A34 (the starting addresses of the ﬁrst and second arrays). Further testing had diﬀer-
ent results, in that with diﬀerent ﬁngerprints diﬀerent arrays were read from. The results
did have some consistencies in that no breakpoint located outside our assumed array lo-
cations were ever activated, and neither were any breakpoints located at the end of our
assumed templates. These results may indicate that perhaps global ﬁngerprint character-
istics such as ﬁngerprint type, or areas of high curvature, are used to obviate the need to
compare against every stored reference template. Also, the fact that each array was not
read in its entirety (500 bytes), indicates all 500 bytes of the template are not used.
Without the size of the reference templates it is diﬃcult to deﬁnitively obtain a reference
template for analysis. Although the results of this experiment did indicate an upper bound
for reference template sizes, the exact sizes still must be determined. Since the entire en-
rolled feature data structure could not be extracting in the running program, new reference
templates would have to be extracted through function calls to the available enrollment
functions of the AliceDrive SDK.
Fingerprint Enrollment Analysis
PTSDK4 SS500A PTFV.dll exports two functions of interest for ﬁngerprint enrollment,
bAPI4 HMFVStartEnroll and bAPI4 HMFVEnroll. The SDK document indicates both
of these functions are indeed involved in enrolling new ﬁngerprints, and dynamic analysis
conﬁrms this. According to the SDK document, bAPI4 HMFVStartEnroll should be called
to start ﬁngerprint enrollment and takes only one parameter, int iDefaultEnrolledTimes
which is the number of times to enroll the ﬁngerprint (recommended 10).
Using the IDA Pro debugger, we observed that bAPI4 HMFVStartEnroll is only called
once and the parameter used is 10, after which bAPI4 HMFVEnroll is called several times.
The SDK document describes bAPI4 HMFVEnroll as actually creating the enrolled fea-
tures. The parameters for bAPI4 HMFVEnroll are as follows:
• int iResolution: the image resolution.
• int iWidth: the image width.
• int iHeight: the image height.
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• BYTE *pFingerImage: pointer to an image buﬀer ready for veriﬁcation.
• BYTE *pEnrolledFeatures: pointer to a buﬀer for returned features.
• DWORD *pwEnRetSize: returned pointer to the enrolled features size.
• int *piStatus: returned pointer to the enrollment status.
The function return values for both bAPI HMFVStartEnroll and bAPI4 HMFVEnroll,
as with all functions in the SDK document are described the same as the return value
for veriﬁcation. Therefore the assumption was made that the return value has the same
meaning for all SDK functions, indicating non-erroneous algorithm operation, and as such
we ignored the return value.
The parameters of bAPI4 HMFVEnroll are very similar to the parameters of bAPI4 H-
MFVVerify with only a few diﬀerences. As expected, both of these functions take in a
parameter described as a ﬁngerprint image, pFingerImage. This image may be an actual
image, however it could be some other data structure which represents a ﬁngerprint image
(e.g., a reference template). In order to create a program to call the AliceDrive enrollment
functions, the structure of this parameter must be determined. Since this parameter is de-
scribed the same in both the veriﬁcation and enrollment functions, discovering the structure
of this parameter may also shed some light on how the veriﬁcation process behaves.
Both veriﬁcation and enrollment are passed additional parameters specifying resolution,
height, and width of the image, already indicating pFingerImage is indeed an image and
not some other data structure. The fact that this information is present at all indicates that
the image is most likely not stored in some predeﬁned image format, such as a bit map or
JPEG, since height, width and resolution information are stored within the data structures
for these formats. Just to make sure, various sizes of the pFingerImage were extracted and
stored. The linux “ﬁle” command was used with these stored binary streams to see if a
recognizable image header could be found. As long as a recognizable header can be found in
the data ﬁle, a complete ﬁle is not necessary for ﬁle type identiﬁcation. All binary streams
used with this command were unrecognized.
Since no known image format was present in pFingerImage and the resolution, width,
and height are required parameters for both veriﬁcation and enrollment, it was assumed
that if pFingerImage is indeed an actual image, then it must be in a raw byte format. In
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order to attempt to extract an image from raw bytes, all information about the image must
be gathered. According to the SDK document, the resolution of the image is a deﬁned
constant at 500, however no deﬁnitions are set for the width and height. Through dynamic
analysis of both enrollment and veriﬁcation, 500 was observed as the value for iResolution,
and the width and height were always observed to be 280 and 320 respectively. Knowing
deﬁnitively the width and height of pFingerImage does not directly indicate the image’s byte
length as there are many schemes for byte representation of an image. Before exhaustively
checking each scheme, the assumption was made that a color image is unlikely since color
adds an extra degree of complexity for minutiae extraction, and it requires higher priced
scanners which are unlikely found in the relatively cheap AliceDrive.
Consulting the SDK document revealed there is a function also present in the AliceDrive
SDK called bAPI4 GetImage. Through dynamic analysis, it was determined this function
was called every time a ﬁngerprint was scanned, either for authentication, or enrollment.
This function supposedly returns a gray ﬁngerprint image in one of its output parameters,
called picture, which is a pointer to a byte array. Because this parameter is not called
pFingerImage, there was some doubt as to whether the two parameters are related, however,
since it is the precursor to any function that requires an image, starting with the assumption
pFingerImage is a gray scale image was logical.
A black and white image could be represented with one bit per pixel, but a gray scale
image is typically represented as one byte per pixel. If this is the case, it is known the image
has a width of 280 and a height of 320. Assuming these values correspond to pixels means
the image has 280 * 320, or 89,600 pixels and consequently 89,600 bytes.
Extracting 89,600 bytes from IDA Pro dynamically can be a bit messy, however analyzing
the pFingerImage parameter at runtime showed the pointer returned by bAPI4 GetImage
for the picture parameter was the same pointer for pFingerImage, whether used for ver-
iﬁcation or enrollment, therefore the returned picture of bAPI4 GetImage is the same as
pFingerImage. A program was then developed to call bAPI4 GetImage and recover an
image for analysis. This required a more detailed analysis of what other library function
calls are necessary in order to call this function. The functions called before a ﬁngerprint
scan from the AliceDrive SDK were observed to be bAPI4 OpenDevice, bAPI4 OpenSensor,
and bAPI4 CheckSensorStatus. Reviewing the descriptions in the SDK document indicated
that bAPI4 CheckSensorStatus was not crucial to capture a ﬁngerprint image, but instead
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checked the current status of the sensor. The sensor status can either be ready or not found,
and since the scanner should always be found, this function was omitted for our program.
The remaining functions were then used in the bAPI4 GetImage test program.
bAPI4 OpenDevice and bAPI4 OpenSensor do not require any parameters, so the only
function call of any complexity was to bAPI4 GetImage. The parameters for bAPI4 GetI-
mage are described in the SDK document as follows:
• BYTE *picture: returned pointer to an image buﬀer.
• int timeout: timeout period for getting the image (in milliseconds).
• int iResolution: image resolution.
• int *piHeight: returned pointer to the height of the image.
• int *piWidth: returned pointer to the width of the image.
Based on the description for the timeout parameter, the value of 1000 (1 second) was
arbitrarily chosen. The value for the parameter iResolution was set to 500 per the speciﬁed
value in the SDK document and the observed value through dynamic analysis. The picture
buﬀer was initialized to a size of 89,600 bytes. After the function call was made, the picture
array was stored in a ﬁle. After running our test program, but before attempting to translate
the raw binary obtained into an image, the ﬁle was opened up in a text editor. Luckily the
characters represented by the binary were all printable, and observing them showed some
kind of pattern. Since a gray scale image usually has a high contrast, it should be possible
to see the image by simply looking at its ASCII representation. As expected, the returned
piHeight and piWidth values were 320 and 280 respectively. Editing the binary in a text
editor, a new line character was placed at the end of every 280 character string. Once each
new line character was in place it was quite evident that this binary was indeed an image.
Reducing the font size in the text editor practically produced an image, as seen in Figure
3.4. Having deﬁnitively ascertained that each byte represents a pixel, and only gray scale
images can be represented with one byte per pixel, it was then easy to convert this raw
binary image into an actual image (Figure 3.5).
Now having determined the format of pFingerImage, it was not only possible to create
a program to call bAPI4 HMFVEnroll and obtain a reference template, but to pass it any
desired image for experimentation. Deciphering pFingerImage also sheds some light into
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Figure 3.4: pFingerImage ASCII Image Figure 3.5: pFingerImage JPEG Image
the way veriﬁcation is performed, as it is now known that the veriﬁcation function takes in
a raw, unprocessed image for comparison.
As with creating a program to call bAPI4 GetImage, a dynamic analysis of the enroll-
ment process was required to determine what other function calls were necessary for the
enrollment process to complete an enrollment program. Systematic dynamic analysis of the
enrollment process yielded the AliceDrive SDK function call structure found in Figure 3.6.
The functions required for setting up the enrollment process are bAPI4 HMFVOpenLib,
bAPI4 HMFVStartEnroll, bAPI4 HMFVSetParas, and bAPI4 OpenSensor. Of these only
bAPI4 HMFVSetParas and bAPI4 HMFVStartEnroll require parameters. As mentioned
before bAPI4 HMFVStartEnroll has one parameter, which was discovered to be 10. The
parameters of bAPI4 HMFVSetParas are int iParaID and int iParaValue. The values of
these parameters were observed through dynamic analysis to be 100 and 0 respectively.
After enrollment setup has been accomplished bAPI4 GetImage is called. The image re-
turned by this function is fed into bAPI4 HMFVVerify for veriﬁcation. If the image is
successfully veriﬁed (veriﬁcation parameter piStatus = 2), the system will not attempt
to enroll the ﬁngerprint, and will prompt for another scan repeatedly apparently with no
limit. This eﬀectively prevents a user from enrolling the same ﬁngerprint multiple times.
If the ﬁngerprint has never been previously enrolled, bAPI4 HMFVEnroll is called. The
system will continually cycle through getting a ﬁngerprint image, verifying the image, and
enrolling if the ﬁngerprint has never been enrolled while piStatus of bAPI4 HMFVEnroll
returns a CONTINUE ﬂag. The SDK document deﬁnes the following ﬂags for piStatus for
bAPI4 HMFVEnroll:
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• HMFV STS EN CONTINUE 1
• HMFV STS EN SUCCESS 0
• HMFV STS EN FAIL -1
• HMFV STS EN NOINIT -2
• HMFV STS EN TOOMANY POORIMG -3
• HMFV STS EN TOOMAY TRIALS -4
Enrollment will terminate if any value other than SUCCESS or CONTINUE is found
in piStatus. If SUCCESS is observed, the value stored in the output parameter pEnrolled-
Features has been properly ﬁlled. At any other time, this output parameter contains only
a seven byte header followed by all zeros. The seven bytes observed in an unsuccessful
pEnrolledFeatures is always the same, and is as follows for each byte:
• 0x78
• 0x01
• 0x33
• 0x00
• 0x78
• 0x01
• 0x33
After enrollment has returned a SUCCESS ﬂag, one ﬁnal call to bAPI4 GetImage then
bAPI4 HMFVVerify is made. According to the GUI at this time, this last swipe is to
conﬁrm enrollment was successful. Unlike normal veriﬁcation, which has been observed
to use a two dimensional array of enrolled features, this time ppEnrolledFeatures only
contains one array, and consequently, iEnrolledNum contains the value 1. Obviously this
last veriﬁcation is to verify the produced reference template is viable, and can authenticate
the user. If unsuccessful, this process is repeated a few more times before enrollment is
terminated. If successful, a call to bAPI4 OpenDevice (which calls bAPI4 OpenSensor) is
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made after which bAPI4 WriteSecureArea is called, presumably permanently saving the
reference template to some hidden partition in the AliceDrive.
bAPI4_HMFVOpenLib
bAPI4_HMFVStartEnroll
bAPI4_HMFVSetParas
bAPI4_OpenSensor
bAPI4_GetImage
bAPI4_HMFVVerify
bAPI4_HMFVEnroll
bAPI4_HMFVCLoseLib?
bAPI4_OpenDevice
bAPI4_OpenSensor
bAPI4_WriteSecureArea
bAPI4_HMFVVerify bAPI4_GetImge?
bAPI4_HMFVCLoseLib?
[fingerprint?verified]?(verification?
piStatus?=?2)?
[else]?
[enrollment?piStatus?=?success]?
[else]?
[enrollment?piStatus?=?continue][else]?
[too?many?tries] [verification?fails]?
Figure 3.6: Dynamic Enrollment Process
Knowing the structure of the enrollment process an enrollment program was created
to read ﬁngerprints from the AliceDrive sensor and save pEnrolledFeatures to a ﬁle. Since
pEnrolledFeatures is a passed in array to the enrollment function, a size had to be chosen.
The SDK document states the maximum size of enrolled features is 500, so the array was ini-
tialized to 500 bytes. Another output parameter for enrollment, pwEnRetSize is described
in the SDK document as the returned enrolled features size. It was our hope that this size
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would indicate how many bytes are in pEnrolledFeatures that are actually a part of the
reference template and this value would not exceed 500 bytes. The returned pEnrolledFea-
tures obtained through various enrollments contained a stream of bytes up until a variable
position. The value of pwEnRetSize always precisely indicated how long in bytes each tem-
plate was, and the normal size observed was between 150 and 190 bytes. Every observed
template’s ﬁrst byte was always 9, and its seventh byte was always 0. Since seven bytes
were observed in the unsuccessful pEnrolledFeatures (returned if piStatus != SUCCESS),
our assumption was these ﬁrst seven bytes are some sort of header. Observing the stored
AliceDrive reference templates passed in to the veriﬁcation function (ppEnrolledFeatures),
showed the starting location of each array begins with 9 and the seventh byte is always 0,
validated our assumption that these enrolled features are indeed the same features used for
veriﬁcation (i.e., the reference templates).
Having now obtained the ability to produce reference templates manually, we may now
remove the call to bAPI4 GetImage and supply our own images for systematic experimen-
tation with the goal of determining the structure and contents of the AliceDrive reference
template data structure.
Break #1: Bypassing Fingerprint Authentication
With the veriﬁcation function’s piStatus parameter having been identiﬁed and conﬁrmed
as the veriﬁcation status variable, the problem in deriving a bypass for authentication now
was in exploiting this information. IDA Pro makes manipulation during execution of the
values in the stack or the register values diﬃcult, so for the initial authentication bypass
attempt, a diﬀerent approach was taken.
The IDA Pro debugger was used to identify the conditional after which piStatus is set to
the value 2. A traditional C style conditional (i.e. an if statement) doesn’t exist in assembly
language. In assembly, a conditional is often achieved by performing some sort of operation
and setting special ﬂag registers. A jump instruction is then used to jump to diﬀerent
locations in the assembly based on these ﬂag registers. For example, a comparison can be
achieved by subtracting two values. If the two values are identical, the subtraction will set
the zero ﬂag register. A conditional jump based on the zero ﬂag will jump to another place
in the assembly code if the zero ﬂag is set, or continue execution after the jump instruction
if the ﬂag is not set.
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The conditional observed in the AliceDrive is a JZ instruction. A JZ is a jump instruction
that is performed if the zero ﬂag is set, much like in the above example. IDA Pro allows for
easy manipulation of ﬂag registers during execution, so for the initial bypass attempt, after
scanning an invalid ﬁngerprint, execution was paused immediately before this JZ instruction.
The zero ﬂag was manually set to 1, and execution was resumed. As a result, the ﬁngerprint
was veriﬁed and the private drive was mounted. Therefore the device does not provide
adequate data security in any way, and even though breaking into the AliceDrive required
research and use of reverse engineering tools and techniques, the device was relatively easy
to crack. Essentially the AliceDrive provides absolutely no security other than security
through the obscurity of deciphering the AliceDrive binaries.
Manually setting the zero ﬂag is not a powerful and permanent solution for an authen-
tication bypass as it requires the user to have some knowledge of assembly language and
access to tools that allow the user to alter the execution of the assembly while the program
is running. The ultimate solution was to use OllyDbg to permanently change the assembly
code for bPTFVVerify. A permanent solution could have been accomplished in any number
of ways, such as manually setting piStatus to 2 immediately before bPTFVVerify returns,
or even manipulating bAPI4 HMFVVerify in the same manner. Our approach was to sim-
ply manipulate the conditional jump to be unconditional, allowing all attempts to verify
a ﬁngerprint to succeed. JMP is the assembly language unconditional jump instruction.
Using OllyDbg, JZ was changed to JMP, a change of only two characters, thereby com-
pletely undermining the security provided through ﬁngerprint authentication. Once this
change was saved to PTFVLib.dll, any acceptable quality ﬁngerprint from anyone, valid
or invalid, passes authentication. The ﬁngerprint must be an acceptable quality because
the manipulated jump instruction occurs after a sanity check has been performed on the
ﬁngerprint scan image. If the image fails the sanity check, the jump is apparently never
executed, and consequently piStatus is never set to 2.
Analysis of the code revealed that this authentication bypass would not work in all
circumstances. If only one reference template is stored on the AliceDrive, a diﬀerent branch
of execution is taken inside bPTFVVerify. As with the above situation, a conditional jump
instruction controls whether the piStatus is set to indicate a veriﬁed or invalid print. The
diﬀerence in this situation is that if this jump is performed, piStatus is set to indicate failure.
Using OllyDbg, this jump instruction was removed and replaced with two bytes of NOP
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instructions. While this forces the execution of the code for valid ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation
attempts, this modiﬁcation was not successful in bypassing authentication.
In reviewing the diﬀerences between the values set for invalid and valid ﬁngerprints,
it was discovered that the value for the output parameter piMatchedID was set to 0 for
valid ﬁngerprints, and for invalid ﬁngerprints the twos complement for -1 was observed
(FFFFFFFF). Using the IDA Pro debugger, execution was paused during assignment to
this parameter for an invalid ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation attempt. Manually placing the value
0 into this parameter (by manually setting the register used for this assignment, EAX),
resulted in a successful authentication. To provide a permanent bypass, the test instruction
used to set the appropriate ﬂags prior to the previously deleted jump instruction uses the
EAX register (TEST EAX, EAX). Changing the test instruction which is only used to set
CPU ﬂags to a sub (subtraction) instruction ensures the EAX register will contain the value
0 (SUB EAX, EAX subtracts the two operands and stores the result in the ﬁrst operand),
and since this registers contents are used in the assignment of piMatchedID, this parameter
will also be 0. By making this ﬁnal change, it was no longer necessary to replace the jump
instruction with NOP instructions. This is because the conditional jump in this case is a
JNZ instruction, which jumps only if the zero ﬂag is not set. By subtracting a register with
itself just prior to the jump instruction ensures the zero ﬂag is always set. We replaced the
previously deleted jump instruction, and simply changed TEST to SUB. Saving this change
to the augmented library ﬁle allows us to bypass authentication in either circumstance.
Running the AliceDrive controller software by using Autorun.exe on the public read-
only drive will always overwrite all modules in the AliceDrive hidden directory. For this
augmented library to work, the controller software must be executed by using AliceDrive.exe
located in the AliceDrive hidden directory.
Break #2: Deciphering Reference Templates
At this point, we knew that reference templates were used for both veriﬁcation and en-
rollment, and that they can be manually pulled out of the veriﬁcation function dynamically.
We had also determined abstractly how reference templates are created and how to create
our own, but the details of the reference template format were still unknown. Using the
built-in mechanisms to make reference templates that we had discovered, we then system-
atically created templates to ﬁnd patterns that will give away the internal structure of the
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AliceDrive reference templates.
Keeping with our initial assumption that the AliceDrive uses minutiae for its reference
templates, a simple experiment was created. A ﬁngerprint image was used as a reference
image. This image, which was in the format of a bit map, was converted into a raw binary
stream of the same format observed for the enrollment and veriﬁcation processes. The
image binary stream was then used for enrollment to produce a reference template. The
image was then manipulated to produce a multitude of variation images. In each variation
image, one feature was changed, which, for most of these images, meant one minutia was
removed or one minutia was added; however, an additional variation was created that was
the negative of the original. Each variation image was converted to a binary stream and
used with the enrollment function to produce a reference template for comparison against
the original unaltered image’s reference template. The results of these comparisons provided
some evidence of the AliceDrive reference template structure.
The major hurdle in analyzing the reference template comparisons was that the eﬀect
of adding or removing minutiae did not produce a uniformly similar result in all reference
templates, i.e., removing one minutia or adding a minutia did not result in a consistent de-
crease or increase in the reference template size for each variation reference template. Also,
while it was the case that some reference templates were hardly aﬀected by the variation,
some were drastically diﬀerent. The assumed explanation for these inconsistent variations
was that manipulation of the original ﬁngerprint image can result in an adverse aﬀect to
the positioning algorithm used by the AliceDrive to standardize positioning for all stored
reference templates. This can happen because global ﬁngerprint characteristics (see chapter
2) are often used for ﬁngerprint positioning. Removing or adding features from a ﬁngerprint
may change these global features and therefore change the positioning of a ﬁngerprint for
reference template creation. If the position changes drastically then characteristics of each
minutia, speciﬁcally location and orientation, will also change drastically, and it could even
result in some minutiae points being lost if positioning leaves some minutiae outside the
minutiae extraction area.
The ﬁrst experiments performed involved removing entire ridges near the periphery of
the ﬁngerprint image. Peripheral ridge manipulation should have minimal if not no aﬀect
on global characteristics of the ﬁngerprint, but a ridge alone is not a minutia point, however
at this point we were uncertain as to whether or not the AliceDrive discriminates between
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ridge ending minutiae and ridges ending because the remaining portion of the ridge falls
outside the sensor range. The reference templates for these variations were no diﬀerent
from the original image reference template, so it was apparent the AliceDrive does make
this discrimination.
Subsequent experiments involved removing ridge endings, not only simple ridge endings,
but also independent ridges and spurs (see Figure 2.3 in chapter 2). Comparing between
these reference templates and the original reference template produced diﬀerences. As
mentioned in the analysis of the enrollment process, a seven byte header was observed,
where the ﬁrst byte is always 9 and the seventh byte is always 0. If this area is a header,
certain information is expected, namely the number of features (minutiae) stored. Analysis
of the remaining bytes of the header for each variation reference template against the original
reference template showed that the numerical diﬀerence between the sixth byte of the ridge
ending removal variations and the original was consistently very small, a diﬀerence of two
or three at most. For a diﬀerence of one, the size of the reference template data structure
was oﬀ by six bytes, if the value was oﬀ by two, the size of the reference template was oﬀ by
twelve bytes, and for a diﬀerence of three the size was oﬀ by eighteen bytes. The assumption
was made that the sixth byte indeed represented the number of minutiae present in the data
structure, and that each minutiae required a total of six bytes to represent. Observing the
templates with the smallest diﬀerence in the sixth byte, where the sixth byte only diﬀered
by one, showed that when compared against the original reference template a contiguous
block of ﬁve bytes somewhere in the data structure was completely missing, and a separate
byte near the end of the data structure was also missing.
The next experiments involved adding bifurcations by extending ridge endings to in-
tersect with an adjacent ridge (using the GNU image manipulation program). Since this
involved changing only a preexisting minutia into another type, the sixth byte was ex-
pected to remain consistent to the original reference template. This was observed, further
validating our assumption of the sixth byte. Like the ridge removal experiments, bifurcation
creation produced varying reference template diﬀerences, however the simplest diﬀerence
observed was a block of ﬁve contiguous bytes and a byte near the end of the data structure,
all other bytes were consistent with the original template.
The experimental results indicated that the abstract reference template structure con-
tained a header, a body, and a trailing footer section. The body contains X number of
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blocks of ﬁve bytes where X is the number observed in the sixth byte of the header. If our
assumption about the header is correct, the bytes of the body should begin at byte eight.
Since it was observed that each ﬁve block byte section has a separate but related byte near
the end of the data structure, following the body section should be X number of bytes, one
for each minutiae (see Figure 3.7). Analyzing the data structure in this manner showed
that this kind of division ﬁts with our observed reference templates, and additional testing
revealed that each byte in the footer section is ordered in accordance to how the ﬁve byte
blocks in the body section are ordered. For example, if the sixth ﬁve byte block in the body
section is removed, then the sixth byte starting from our deﬁned footer section would also
be missing.
Researching popular reference template data structures did turn up some structures
that have deﬁned header, body and footer sections, such as BIO API [2], however the size
and values for the header were not consistent with our ﬁndings and even if they were, the
exact formatting of each minutiae in the body section is still proprietary. There are many
proposed data structures for minutiae in which they are represented with six bytes but
these diﬀer not only with the characteristics stored for minutiae but also the number of bits
used for each characteristic. No such schemes were apparently consistent with the observed
AliceDrive reference template structure.
In an attempt to derive whether the minutiae type is stored, an additional experiment
was performed using the reference template of the negative image of the original. A ﬁnger-
print negative will contain the same number of minutiae in roughly the same locations, but
the types will be inverted, i.e., bifurcations become ridge endings and ridge endings become
bifurcations. Comparing the negative reference template with the original did not yield any
ﬁndings and did not deﬁnitively point to any part of the data structure that would store the
minutiae type. If the type of each minutia is stored, it could still be veriﬁed by using the
veriﬁcation function with the original image, but using the negative reference template for
comparison. If veriﬁcation fails, it is likely minutiae type is stored in the reference template.
Performing this veriﬁcation attempt was successful, possibly indicating minutiae types are
not stored in the template, however it could be the nature of the matching algorithm. It
seems unlikely that type would not be stored, since it is easy to store (within one or two
bits) and is rather important for distinguishing ﬁngerprints, that is, if this information is
not present, the distinguishing characteristics stored by the reference template are dimin-
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ished. Therefore, it could be within the error tolerance of the veriﬁcation algorithm to allow
validation of a negative ﬁngerprint with a non-negative template, or vise versa, since all
other data is almost identical.
Through static analysis of the reference templates created for this experiment, essen-
tially only the generalized structure depicted in Figure 3.7 was now known. To gain any
more details of the reference template structure, a more detailed analysis of how reference
templates are created was necessary.
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Number of Minutiae (X)
Byte 0
Byte 5
Header
…
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Body
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Figure 3.7: Abstract Reference Template Structure
The parameter for enrollment pEnrolledFeatures will contain a reference template once
enrollment succeeds. Following this parameter during enrollment should reveal how data is
stored in it, and consequently, the breakdown of minutiae characteristics in the template.
In one unnamed subroutine called during enrollment execution and traced through static
analysis, pEnrolledFeatures is passed in as a parameter, and values are stored in it. After the
header sections, blocks of data of the following sizes are placed into the pEnrolledFeatures
data structure:
• 11 bits
• 11 bits
• 2 bits
• 8 bits
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• 8 bits
At a later point in the code, a ﬁnal byte is placed in the structure as well (presumably
the sixth byte in the assumed footer). Minutiae are typically represented by location (a
Cartesian coordinate pair), orientation (an angle), and a type (bifurcation, ridge ending,
or other). Location is typically of a high importance, so we made the assumption that the
ﬁrst 22 bits stored represent 11 bits for an X value and 11 bits for a Y value. Additionally,
since minutiae type can be represented in one or two bits, the smallest observed block of
2 bits was assumed to represent type. Orientation was assumed to be represented by the
following 8 bits after the supposed type bits. This leaves the ﬁnal byte of the contiguous
ﬁve byte block and the trailing sixth byte as unknown.
From each block of ﬁve bytes located in a selected reference template, the ﬁrst 22 bits
were captured, the ﬁrst 11 bits were considered X coordinates, and the next 11 bits were
considered Y coordinates. Initial mapping of these locations on the image that produced
the reference template did not line up, no matter how the mapping or the original image
was scaled, rotated, or positioned. Reviewing the mapping more carefully, and trying to
ﬁnd a orientation that worked, the mapping does line up if the image is rotated 180 degrees
and ﬂipped. As seen in Figure 3.8 this mapping falls on almost all minutiae in the image
therefore we considered our location values veriﬁed and proceeded to prove our assumption
of the remaining bytes in the reference template data structure.
Figure 3.8: Left: the original image. Right: the rotated and ﬂipped image
Before attempting to map the minutiae type and orientation onto the image, the ori-
entation value had to be deciphered. Orientation is an angle, and an angle is represented
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usually as an integer [0-360). One byte can only store up to 256 integers (0-255). An angle
can be made to ﬁt into a single byte by dividing the angle by a transform value, and the byte
representation can be converted back by multiplying by transform value. The transform
value in this case would be 360/255 or approximately 1.4118.
Also before mapping, two angle characteristics must be determined, the starting angle
(angle 0) and the direction in which angles increase (clockwise or counterclockwise). An
angle is analogous to a hand on a clock. The hands move in a particular direction, and
point to a particular location. It is not suﬃcient to deﬁne an angle simply by an axis, but
rather the direction the angle points must also be speciﬁed. Before mapping of the reference
template angles, it was assumed the starting position is the X axis pointing to the right (due
east), and angles increase counterclockwise (this is in accordance with angle representation
in the standard [17]).
For type, only two values were observed in the supposed type value for any reference
template, the values 1 and 2. A circle was mapped to the value 1 and a diamond to the
value 2. The complete mapping of location, type and orientation to the rotated and ﬂipped
image is seen in Figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9: Location, Type, and Orientation Mapping
Further mappings with other reference templates to their respective images had similar
results. The types and location were obviously correct. Orientation was not exactly perfect,
but storing an angle in a single byte does result in a loss of precision. With respect to ridge
endings, angles always point back toward the terminating ridge where as with bifurcations
angles point toward the valley between the bifurcation. In the standard [17], angles are
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always determined for ridge endings, therefore for bifurcations, the image negative is taken
(thereby causing bifurcations to become ridge endings), and the angle is derived from the
resulting ridge ending. The AliceDrive apparently adopts this strategy as well.
Our mapping experiments had previously only been attempted on one ﬁngerprint image.
To further validate our format ﬁndings, we used an additional ﬁngerprint. The resulting ref-
erence template mapping produced for this image and its reference template was consistent
with the above ﬁndings.
Although for each minutiae stored in the AliceDrive reference templates there are two
additional bytes that are still unknown, having deciphered this much of the reference tem-
plate we have shown that not only is the reference template data structure insecure but we
believe that based on [19] this is enough information to conceivably reconstruct the original
ﬁngerprints for any acquired reference template.
Summary
Through our experimentation and observation we have shown that the AliceDrive fails
to protect the two critical security areas of ﬁngerprint-secured data, the private data itself
and the ﬁngerprint reference templates. Not only are the private data and the reference
templates stored in the clear, but no obfuscation techniques are used whatsoever to deter
reverse engineering. Through analysis of the veriﬁcation function we were able to bypass
authentication to gain access to the private drive, and to manually pull out all reference
templates contained in the AliceDrive used for veriﬁcation.
Furthermore, and probably more importantly, we were also able to derive a partial
format of the reference template data structure. The only minutiae characteristics we
were looking for were location, orientation, and type, and yet while we did decipher these
characteristics from the reference template, the template still stores an additional two bytes
per each minutia. Based on the work in [19] we considered location, orientation, and type
enough information to theoretically derive an original ﬁngerprint.
Further Research
Although we believe we have deciphered enough information from the AliceDrive ref-
erence templates to conceivably reconstruct a ﬁngerprint, there are two addition bytes
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unaccounted for in the reference template data structure. We have made some assumptions
that perhaps one of the remaining bytes represents quality such that only the highest qual-
ity minutiae are used for authentication and the lowest quality minutiae would only be used
if there were no matches among the higher quality minutiae. We are unsure as to whether
this assumption is valid or not, and even if it is, this still leaves one byte completely unac-
counted for, for which we do not have any assumptions at all. Further research is needed
to ascertain the purpose of these two bytes.
Additionally, we have not provided any mechanism for obtaining reference templates
automatically. Automatic extraction of reference templates, as with our automatic authen-
tication bypass is more powerful since it does not require any knowledge or special tools.
During our research we attempted to ﬁnd a way to extract them without having to manu-
ally copy and paste the binary from IDA Pro, but none of our eﬀorts proved fruitful. The
function bAPI4 ReadSecureArea in the AliceDrive SDK module plays a part in retrieving
these templates, but does not retrieve them directly. Somehow the data retrieved by this
function is converted by AliceDrive.exe into the reference templates. The function that is
responsible for this conversion is not publicly accessible, and since it is apparent this func-
tion uses many global variables, simply extracting the assembly to create our own function
was too time consuming for this research.
As stated in the introduction, the hardware was considered a black box, but the internal
physical structure of the device is of some interest. The exact location of where all the system
data (the user proﬁles, libraries, etc.) is stored is still unknown. Fully understanding the
hardware may make it possible to somehow mount this drive as well as the private drive
without any use of the AliceDrive software.
Finally, our authentication bypass provided in this chapter is not necessary the best
solution, as it still requires a ﬁngerprint, and the ﬁngerprint has to pass an image sanity
check. Through our observations, the function bMediaChange2Flash in the AliceDrive SDK,
once called, mounts the private drive. Some attempt was made, after our provided bypass
had been created, to call this function directly in order to mount the private drive obviating
the need to provide any ﬁngerprint for authentication, but all attempts failed. Since we
had a bypass at this time, not much eﬀort was placed in pursuing this route; however, this
bypass could prove much more powerful, as it would work even if the scanner no longer
functions.
Chapter 4
AliceDrive Fuzzy Vault
In the previous chapter, the AliceDrive was scrutinized from a security perspective. The
results of this analysis indicate that the two facets of ﬁngerprint biometric data security (the
private data and the reference templates) are unprotected and in clear text on the device.
In addition, the reference template format of the AliceDrive was partially derived revealing
signiﬁcant information about the ﬁngerprints they represent. In order for the AliceDrive
to provide adequate ﬁngerprint-based security, the private data must be encrypted using
current cryptographic mechanisms (e.g., AES) in which the key is derived from the user’s
ﬁngerprint, and any required reference templates cannot be recoverable by unauthorized
individuals. A function to produce an AES key from a ﬁngerprint is trivial, the problem
is producing consistent keys. Due to intra-class variation some sort of reference data must
be made public for consistent key generation using the same ﬁngerprint. As discussed in
the previous chapter, storing any ﬁngerprint reference data in clear text undermines the
security of the scheme and may allow for the reconstruction of the original ﬁngerprint. This
would seem to be an irreconcilable paradox, as the reference data must be stored in the clear
but should not be accessible by unauthorized individuals. As discussed in chapter 2, fuzzy
extractor schemes have been suggested for various biometrics, including ﬁngerprints, which
theoretically solve this issue. In this chapter we adopt a fuzzy extractor mechanism, specif-
ically fuzzy vault (see chapter 2), for a proposed academic and unimplemented AliceDrive
fuzzy vault.
The provided fuzzy vault adaptation is based on the ﬁngerprint-based fuzzy vault of
[16], to be further referred to as FFV. The purpose of the proposed implementation of
this chapter is to illustrate the issues and possible parameters of a ﬁngerprint-based fuzzy
vault for the AliceDrive. Although we do make suggestions for improvement of FFV, our
primary goal is to demonstrate that a practical improvement to the AliceDrive may be
possible, and provide a starting place for future research. This proposal is limited in that
no implementation is made, nor is the scheme heavily scrutinized.
Before citing the diﬀerence of our proposed adaptation of FFV, a general overview of
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the original FFV scheme is described. Following this, issues and concerns for the proposed
AliceDrive fuzzy vault are discussed.
Original Scheme Overview
As described in chapter 2, the scheme proposed in FFV is itself based on the fuzzy vault
scheme of [11, 12]. FFV is ﬁngerprint-based fuzzy vault in which minutiae characteristics
of location and orientation are used for vault encoding. Minutiae location and orientation
are converted to binary string representations which are then concatenated to form a string
of 16 bits, X, for each minutiae. Each X is then encoded into a vault using a polynomial, P.
The result, P(X), is a value in a Galois ﬁnite ﬁeld of 216 (denoted GF(216)). The coordinate
(X, P(X)) for each minutiae is stored in the vault along with many chaﬀ points that do not
lie on P. The encoding polynomial secures a secret, K, in its coeﬃcients. The entire secret
is encoded over n 16 bit coeﬃcients where n is the degree of the encoding polynomial. FFV
diﬀers from the ﬁrst proposed fuzzy vault of [11, 12] in that set intersection error correction
is used to account for intra-class variation as opposed to Reed-Solomon (set diﬀerence) error
correction. Set intersection works by attempting to derive the original polynomial for every
permutation of T elements in the unlocking set with Lagrange’s polynomial interpolation,
where T represents the Lagrange polynomial decoding threshold (n+1). As such, in order
to determine a matching polynomial, FFV appends to K a 16 bit cyclic redundancy check
(CRC) code generated for the secret. This CRC code is appended in the remaining coef-
ﬁcient of the encoding polynomial. For every polynomial generated during decoding, the
CRC code is extracted and used to validate the remaining coeﬃcients. If the CRC ﬁnds no
error, there is a high probability the original polynomial has been decoded.
The nature of fuzzy vault does account for some intra-class variation through selec-
tion/ﬁltering of vault elements, but only minor diﬀerences are corrected. Alignment is still
required to correct the vast majority of diﬀerences between the encoding print and subse-
quent prints. During vault encoding, alignment helper data is extracted based on global
ﬁngerprint characteristics, speciﬁcally areas of high curvature. The helper data must be
stored publicly, and consequently cannot reveal any information about the original ﬁnger-
print or K. According to FFV, areas of high curvature do not reveal suﬃcient information
to reconstruct the ﬁngerprint or the ﬁngerprint orientation ﬁeld, and therefore may be made
public.
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FFV also stipulates that only minutiae that are above a speciﬁed quality threshold may
be used for vault encoding or unlocking. Furthermore, only minutiae that are considered
well separated from other minutiae may be used for encoding or unlocking. The former
ensures that a key is not generated from specious minutiae and the latter ensures each
minutiae point is assigned a unique value when encoded into the ﬁnite ﬁeld.
An abstract overview of both the encoding and decoding procedures for FFV is described
below.
FFV Vault Encoding Procedure:
1. Minutiae are extracted from a template image. A quality index is applied to each
extracted minutia. In addition, alignment helper data is also extracted.
2. Well separated and high quality minutiae are selected for encoding, called the locking
set.
3. Chaﬀ minutiae are created by generating random location and orientation values. A
chaﬀ point is selected for encoding if the value generated is unique, and well separated
from all other previously selected chaﬀ and genuine minutiae.
4. The locking set and chaﬀ minutiae selected for encoding are represented as bit strings
for location (a Cartesian coordinate pair) and orientation (an angle). The strings of
location and orientation are then concatenated to form 16 bit values, X, for vault
encoding.
5. The degree of the polynomial is selected, n, and a secret, K, of 16n bits is generated.
Appended to this secret is a 16 bit CRC code for K. This creates a new secret, K ′ of
16(n+1) bits.
6. K ′ is encoded into a polynomial, P, of degree n by dividing K ′ into 16 bit sections,
and considering them coeﬃcients of P.
7. Each X derived from the locking set is then evaluated using P to form vault X and Y
coordinates (X, P(X)). The remaining chaﬀ X values are given random Y values such
that Y does not lie on P.
8. The vault is randomly reordered. The vault and the helper data are stored publicly.
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FFV Vault Decoding Procedure:
1. Minutiae are extracted from a query image. A quality index is applied to each ex-
tracted minutia and alignment helper data is also extracted.
2. An alignment algorithm is used to align the query minutiae set. Alignment is accom-
plished using the query alignment helper data and the stored alignment helper data
for the template image.
3. Well separated and high quality minutiae from the query image are selected.
4. The vault abscissa values are broken into binary strings of location and orientation.
5. The location and orientation values in the vault are used with the query minutiae loca-
tion and orientation values to ﬁrst coarsely ﬁlter chaﬀ points, then a minutia matching
algorithm is used to select vault values from the remaining unﬁltered vault elements.
The coarse ﬁlter marks vault values as chaﬀ if the minimum distance between the
vault minutiae and the query minutiae is greater than some threshold.
6. For each matching vault abscissa with the query minutiae, the vault coordinate is
added to the unlocking set.
7. Every subset of n+1 from the unlocking set is used with the Lagrange interpolation
formula to recover a polynomial, P ′.
8. For every recovered P ′, the CRC code is extracted to validate remaining coeﬃcients.
If an error is detected, the secret has not been recovered. If no error is detected, there
is a high probability P ′ = P , and consequently the original secret has been recovered.
The experiments performed on the implemented FFV scheme are primarily concerned
with the rates at which valid ﬁngerprints unlock the vault (genuine accept rates, GAR),
invalid ﬁngerprints unlock the vault (false accept rates, FAR), and failure of ﬁngerprints
to meet the minimum number minutiae requirements for either unlocking or locking the
vault (failure-to-capture rates, FTCR). The minimum number of minutiae required for
both unlocking and locking, r, is a requirement on the number of genuine points in the
vault. Setting r across all ﬁngerprints results in higher FTCR. To account for this, FFV
allows r to be set individually for each ﬁngerprint however the value must be within a set
range.
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Experiments were performed on two diﬀerent ﬁngerprint databases using variable poly-
nomial degrees, genuine points in the vault and number of chaﬀ points. The total number
of points in the vault as well as minimum distance parameters remained consistent among
experiments using the same ﬁngerprint database. Although FFV claims to provide improve-
ments to GAR, FAR, and FTCR when compared to their earlier attempt for this scheme
[21] the security and eﬃciency details are missing for each parameter set used. They claim
the decoding mean time was 8 seconds, and that the mean number of candidate secrets is
33, but the details of how they arrived at these ﬁgures are absent. Similarly, they claim that
for a polynomial of degree 8, and a vault containing 24 genuine and 200 chaﬀ points, that
the expected number of combinations that need to be evaluated to brute force the vault is
2.5x109, corresponding to a 13 year computation time. Again, the details as to how this
number of combinations computes to 13 years is not present.
While security is not scrutinized in FFV, they do address a few security concerns. Be-
sides the relatively weak security of their claimed 13 years brute force computation time,
they also address issues involving the alignment helper data. While the alignment helper
data itself does not allow for reconstruction of the ﬁngerprint minutiae or an orientation
ﬁeld, it may allow a clever attacker to ﬁlter chaﬀ points from the vault based on minutiae
orientation. The other concern addressed is their assumption of uniform spatial distribu-
tion of minutiae, as related to their stipulation of a minimum spatial minutiae threshold.
This assumption is not correct, as usually minutiae are clustered. They claim that this
assumption may allow an attacker to use statistical minutiae distribution models to ﬁlter
chaﬀ points.
Proposed Fuzzy Vault Implementation
A pure adaptation of the FFV scheme for the AliceDrive would require simply increasing
the bit string sizes for each minutiae used for encoding from 16 bits, to match the size of
the AliceDrive location and orientation data, 30 bits (although since this does not lie on a
byte boundary 32 bits is more tractable). We, however, consider a pure adaptation to be
undesirable for many reasons.
One undesirable characteristic noted of FFV is the possible ﬁltering of chaﬀ points
from the vault using the alignment helper data. FFV suggests mitigating this problem
by adding a suﬃcient number of chaﬀ points whose orientation is derived from alignment
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helper data. Since this eﬀectively standardizes the orientation of all minutiae in the vault,
the orientation data may not provide that much distinctiveness. We propose removing
orientation information from each minutia and to mitigate the loss of distinctiveness for
each minutia, we also propose adding minutiae type. The total number of bits required for
this information for the AliceDrive is 24 bits (22 for location and 2 for type).
Another security concern noted in FFV is the assumption that the minutiae spatial
distribution is naturally uniform. This may allow an attacker to ﬁlter the vault of chaﬀ
using statistical minutiae distribution models. Their reasoning for requiring well separated
minutiae is to assure that unique values are assigned when they are encoded into the ﬁnite
ﬁeld, but we do not see the necessity for this stipulation. Increasing the Galois ﬁeld from
GF(216) to GF(224) assures that every X value encoded into the vault can have a unique
Y value. We therefore propose that this spatial separation stipulation be removed for both
encoding and decoding minutiae and that the ﬁnite ﬁeld be increased to 24 bits (GF(224)).
The degree of the polynomial determines the size of the secret secured by the vault.
With a ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(224) each coeﬃcient may contain 24 bits. An AES 128 key cannot
be evenly distributed into 24 bit coeﬃcients. A scheme could be devised to spread this key
over these coeﬃcients; however we recommend the use of an AES 192 key which is evenly
divisible by 24, obviating the need for any special operations to store the key. A polynomial
of degree 8 could conceal an AES 192 key as well as a 24 bit CRC code. The threshold to
decode would then be 9 genuine vault points. As mentioned in chapter 2, 12-15 minutiae are
generally accepted for high probability ﬁngerprint matching. As such, we propose that the
polynomial degree be set at a minimum of 11 (requiring 12 genuine vault points to unlock
the vault), leaving more coeﬃcients than is necessary for encoding the AES 192 key and
the 24 bit CRC code. We propose that 8 24 bit coeﬃcients be reserved for AES key, and
one 24 bit coeﬃcient be used as a CRC code. The remaining coeﬃcients should be chosen
randomly from the ﬁnite ﬁeld universe. Since the CRC is only computed on the AES key,
the entire polynomial does not have to be recovered during vault decoding.
Concerning the size of the vault, speciﬁcally the number of chaﬀ points to generate, we
take a paranoid approach. Given the current worlds fastest computer, with a computational
capacity at 1.759 PFLOPS we assume the worst case scenario, that each CPU cycle equals
one vault decoding attempt. The number of vault decoding attempts possible in a century
is then approximately 5.55x1024. We propose that the total number of invalid permutations
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of the vault unlocking threshold in the vault be at least 5.55x1024. For example, given a
decoding threshold of 12 and 24 genuine points in the vault, if we choose 2078 chaﬀ points,
the total number of possible combinations is
(
2102
12
)
≈ 1.5× 1031 and of these combinations
(
24
12
)
≈ 2.7 × 106 will unlock the vault and recover the secret. The probability that a
combination of points unlocks the secret is (2.7 × 106)/(1.5 × 1031) ≈ 1.8 × 10−25 and the
expected number of combinations needed to be evaluated is (1.5 × 1031)/(2.7 × 106) ≈
5.56× 1024.
Finally, we propose that the vault need not be randomly organized, but instead ordered
according to the vault abscissa values. We do not see the security concerns requiring random
organization, and it may in fact be a hindrance on eﬃciency during vault decoding. Also,
we propose that along with the vault and the alignment helper data, the number of genuine
points in the vault, r, be made public such that users know the maximum number of points
that need to be selected for vault decoding. Without this information, a user could select
any number of vault points, which could greatly impact the eﬃciency of the scheme. All
other details of the scheme are described in FFV, and those that are not, we leave up to
the implementer.
Issues and Concerns
Increasing the number of chaﬀ points in the vault also increases the vault’s security,
but coupled with the lack of a spatial minimum distance threshold for genuine points and
chaﬀ, may have an adverse aﬀect on its eﬃciency, making the scheme practically useless.
As the number of chaﬀ increases, it is more likely chaﬀ minutiae will be placed spatially
close to a genuine minutiae and have the same type. If this occurs it is conceivable that
ﬁltering these chaﬀ points may be very diﬃcult, resulting in their frequent selection for the
unlocking set. If this occurs for many genuine points, it may result in extreme diﬃcultly in
decoding the vault, rendering it ineﬀective. The exact nature of what constitutes spatially
close minutiae such that it results in the above scenario is dependent on the alignment and
ﬁltering algorithms of FFV, which we consider a black box. More research is necessary to
ﬁrst see if this problem poses a serious concern, and if it does, determine a possible solution.
Of course the primary issue with the proposed scheme is the fact that it is unimplemented
and untested. Questions still remain as to how the parameters of the scheme will aﬀect
FAR, GAR, and FTCR rates, as well as the overall eﬃciency and any possible loopholes to
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undermine the computational security the scheme provides.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Fingerprint-secured USB drives are increasingly more available for purchase recently.
This thesis studies the security of a representative ﬁngerprint-secured USB drive called
AliceDrive.
In chapter 3, through systematic analysis and testing of the AliceDrive, a veriﬁcation
bypass was created to access the private drive without a valid ﬁngerprint. Furthermore,
we were able to recover stored ﬁngerprint reference templates on the device, and through
some experimentation, most of the format of these templates was deciphered, conceivably
allowing an attacker to recover the original ﬁngerprint.
In addition, we have provided an academic and unimplemented security improvement
based on the fuzzy vault scheme in chapter 4. While this scheme is limited in its impact
since it is not implemented, this, suggestion does provide an idea of the kind of issues and
steps required for realistic ﬁngerprint-based fuzzy vault implementations and a basis for
future research.
To our knowledge, this is the only formal security analysis or formal documentation
of any kind of a device such as the AliceDrive. Our contribution is oﬃcially bringing to
the attention of the public the possible vulnerabilities of any ﬁngerprint-secured USB drive
and the current state of commercial ﬁngerprint-based data security in relation to current
ﬁngerprint-based biometric security mechanisms.
Areas of Further Research
In chapter 3, future work is suggested for alternative and more powerful vulnerability
exploits as well as further analysis of the AliceDrive, including more in-depth investigation
into both the AliceDrive hardware and reference template data structure. Fully implement-
ing and testing a fuzzy vault implementation or any fuzzy extractor mechanism, whether
that suggested in chapter 4 or some other realization, speciﬁcally for a commercial drive
such as the AliceDrive is of a high interest for future work as well. Such an implementation
would bridge the gap between the theoretical and commercial worlds.
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